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When Agencies Make Criminal Law  
Brenner M. Fissell* 
The nondelegation doctrine prohibits a legislature from delegating its power to an 
administrative agency, yet it is famously underenforced—even when the delegation results in 
the creation of criminal offenses (so-called “administrative crimes”). While this practice 
appears to scandalize the hornbook presumption that legislatures alone define criminal 
offenses, it has long been ratified by the Supreme Court and has received little scholarly 
attention. The few commentators who have addressed administrative crimes highlight the 
intuition that criminal sanctions are uniquely severe and thus deserving of a more rigorous 
nondelegation analysis, but they stop there. They do not precisely link the severe aspects of 
criminal punishment with a requirement for the type of institutions that can create criminal 
law. This Article provides that link. I argue that the two most significant dimensions of 
criminal punishment—community condemnation and liberty deprivation—implicate the 
concerns of two prominent political theories of punishment: expressivism and liberalism. A 
latent but mostly unstated premise of both theories, I claim, is that criminalization must be 
undertaken by a democratic institution. Given this, administrative crimes should be seen as 
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Nondelegation doctrines prohibit a legislature from delegating its power to an 
executive branch entity,1 but they are rarely enforced.2 This is true even when the 
delegation results in the creation of criminal offenses—a practice at odds with 
criminal law’s background presumption of legislative offense definition. While a 
leading treatise states “[i]t is for the legislative branch of a state or the federal 
government to determine . . . the kind of conduct which shall constitute a crime,”3 
administratively created crimes nevertheless proliferate. 
These “administrative crimes” appear when an offense created by a legislature 
incorporates by reference a rule that is itself determined by an agency. Take for 
example the Rules of Conduct for riding on the New York City Subway. The state 
legislature created an agency to operate the subway, the New York City Transit 
Authority, and delegated to that agency the power “[t]o make, amend and repeal 
rules governing the conduct and safety of the public as it may deem necessary, 
convenient or desirable for the use and operation of the transit facilities under its 
 
1. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (“The nondelegation doctrine is 
rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government. The 
Constitution provides that ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States,’ U.S. Const., Art. I, § 1, and we long have insisted that ‘the integrity and maintenance 
of the system of government ordained by the Constitution’ mandate that Congress generally cannot 
delegate its legislative power to another Branch.”); Matz v. J.L. Curtis Cartage Co., 7 N.E.2d 220,  
224–25 (Ohio 1937) (“It is an accepted doctrine in our constitutional law that the lawmaking 
prerogative is a sovereign power conferred by the people upon the legislative branch of the government, 
in a state or the nation, and cannot be delegated to other officers, board or commission, or branch of 
government. Thus neither the Congress of the United States nor the General Assembly of Ohio can 
delegate its legislative power . . . .”). 
2. See generally Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 
165 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (2017) (regarding federal underenforcement of doctrine). For a discussion of 
enforcement in state law, which is more mixed, see infra Section III.B. 
3. 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 10 (15th ed. 2019). 
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jurisdiction.”4 Violation of these rules is punishable by up to ten days incarceration.5 
The Authority is controlled by a seventeen-member board, with the members 
appointed by the Governor of New York.6 Pursuant to its delegated rulemaking 
powers, the Authority has prohibited engaging in certain disorderly conduct (such 
as littering or drinking alcohol), possessing weapons, and entering certain restricted 
areas.7 The penalty provision elevates this rulemaking by an agency board into a 
criminal offense, punishable just as severely as violations of legislatively  
determined rules. 
Administrative crime like the subway rules are pervasive in American law, and 
have an impressive pedigree at the U.S. Supreme Court—despite the Court’s 
technical adherence to a nondelegation doctrine. These offenses were first upheld 
against a nondelegation challenge in 1911, and an unbroken line of cases since that 
time has continued to ratify the practice.8 Emblematic of this status quo is the 1991 
decision in Touby v. United States,9 where the Court approved of the regime set up 
by the Controlled Substances Act: the Attorney General, not Congress, determined 
what drugs would be “scheduled” and thus illegal to manufacture or possess.10 Many 
state high courts have taken a similar approach when analyzing their state 
constitutions. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court has written approvingly 
of delegations to agencies (backed by criminal sanctions) relating to topics ranging 
from alcohol sales to workplace safety to sanitation.11 
A small body of scholarship has criticized administrative crimes, arguing that 
these products of legislative delegation should be analyzed differently from the 
typical agency regulation. Supporting this objection is the common intuition that 
criminal sanctions are uniquely severe—especially in that criminal violations result 
in liberty deprivations and in stigmatization of the offender. This intuition is correct, 
but undertheorized; it fails to precisely state why these aspects of criminal sanctions 
imply limitations on the types of institutions that can or should create criminal law. 
That is the goal of this Article. 
I will claim that the vast and growing body of administrative crimes is 
illegitimate because agencies are an illegitimate source of criminal law. To say that 
the legitimacy of criminal laws depends on their source, though, requires a political 
theory of punishment—a theory that provides principles by which criminalization 
institutions can be assessed. I employ two such theories: expressivism and 
 
4.   N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1204 (McKinney 2019). 
5.   Id. 
6.   N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1201, 1263 (McKinney 2019). 
7.   N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.7 (2019). 
8.   See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). This was recently reaffirmed in Gundy  
v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (holding delegation to Attorney General to determine 
retroactivity of criminally enforced sex offender registration requirements constitutional). See infra 
Section III.B regarding state law. 
9.   Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991). 
10. Id. at 167. 
11. People v. Lowrie, 761 P.2d 778, 782–83 (Colo. 1988). 
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liberalism. Together they comprise two of the most prominent and influential 
attempts to analyze the political aspects of punishment.12 I unearth from these 
theories a background presumption that is mostly unstated: criminalization must be 
democratic in its origins. This conclusion proves fatal to the legitimacy of 
administrative crimes. 
First, consider the so-called “expressive” theory of punishment. The central 
insight of expressivism is that criminal punishment involves not just “hard 
treatment,” such as imprisonment, but also communicates symbolic condemnation 
from the community. Because this condemnation must come from the community, 
though, the determination of what conduct merits condemnation must also be a 
community decision. Expressivism thus demands democratic criminalization, 
meaning that administrative crimes are illegitimate in the eyes of an expressivist. 
Since agency decision-makers are not elected by a majority of the members of the 
political community, they cannot claim to act on behalf of that community or speak 
for it. This deprives what I call “bureaucratic condemnations” of the symbolic 
significance that legal punishment requires; only a political majority’s condemnation 
decisions carry meaning as the voice of the community itself. 
Bureaucratic condemnations are most problematic in the (hopefully) rare cases 
when they condemn conduct that a majority of citizens believes to be unworthy of 
state condemnation. Agency expertise trumps public will when determining 
regulations, yet the administrative crimes promulgated by the agency purport to 
condemn offenders in the name of the same community that disapproves of the 
offense. This irony reveals the larger legitimacy problem at issue—there is no 
necessary connection between public will and criminalization. But this also means 
that even when popular will does support a bureaucratic condemnation, say, out of 
coincidence, the condemnation is still problematic because it comes from the wrong 
source. When a bureaucrat chooses to punish conduct that most people think is 
worth condemning, the lucky alignment of bureaucratic and popular will is not 
enough to imbue that condemnation with the symbolic significance required of 
state punishment. 
Next, consider the “liberal” or consent-based theory of punishment. This 
theory starts with the premise that human beings are free and equal, and therefore 
views state punishment as prima facie illegitimate, given that it involves coercion. 
The liberal theory is most concerned with the fact that criminalization results in 
liberty restrictions, both through prohibiting acts (and thus deterring people from 
engaging in them), and also in incarcerating them if they violate the prohibitions. 
Free individuals do not create the state so that it can undermine their freedom, 
though, and therefore state punishment can only be reconciled with freedom if the 
 
12. Unlike the dominant moral theories of punishment, retributivism and utilitarianism, I argue 
that expressive and liberal theories have necessary implications for the structure of the political 
institutions that create criminal law. Retributivism and utilitarianism can accommodate a wide range of 
different institutional forms so long as the criminalization institution accurately assesses desert or utility. 
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citizen can be thought to constructively consent to it, thereby legitimizing it. Liberal 
theory posits that this consent is granted in the expectation of mutual benefit. As 
one early liberal thinker, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, wrote, “[I]t is in order not to be 
the victim of a murderer that a person consents to die if he becomes one.”13 Free 
and equal individuals, though, would only constructively consent to political 
authority exercised via democratic lawmaking institutions—institutions that accord 
respect to individual autonomy and equality. And if this is true of coercive legislation 
more generally, it is especially true of criminal offenses backed by violent sanctions. 
Thus, liberal theory demands that criminalization institutions be democratic in order 
for punishment to be legitimate. This means that administrative crimes cannot 
satisfy the “Liberal Principle of Legitimacy”14: free and equal individuals would not 
constructively consent to punishment determinations made by bureaucratic agency 
leaders on the basis of their claim to expert knowledge. 
Expressive and liberal theories of punishment each impose a requirement of 
democratic criminalization. Each is therefore an independent and alternative reason 
for rejecting the legitimacy of administrative crimes. The claim of this Article is 
limited to the legitimacy of these offenses as a matter of political theory, and 
therefore does not have a necessary implication for their status in constitutional law. 
However, the claim does seem relevant if the Court chooses to engage in a 
functionalist analysis of the nondelegation doctrine in future cases. If one accepts 
that criminal punishment entails special burdens on citizens such that it may only 
be legitimately imposed by a certain institution, then delegations of power from that 
institution to institutions of a different character may invite a more probing scrutiny 
by the nondelegation doctrine.15 While some may balk at the implications of this 
conclusion for the continued existence of the administrative state, this concern is 
overblown. Civil penalties, and all their deterrent value, would remain untouched.16 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses examples of administrative 
crimes in both federal and state law, and briefly addresses the difficulties in making 
a comprehensive assessment of the number of these offenses. Part II explicates the 
long line of U.S. Supreme Court cases discussing administrative crimes and the 
federal nondelegation doctrine, as well as how important state high courts have 
applied their state constitutional law to this issue. Part III reviews the small body of 
 
13. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 64 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith 
R. Masters trans., St. Martin’s Press 1978) (1762). 
14. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 137 (2005). 
15. The Court in Touby indicated that it was at least open to considering this. Touby, 500  
U.S. at 165–66 (1991) (“Petitioners suggest, however, that something more than an ‘intelligible 
principle’ is required when Congress authorizes another Branch to promulgate regulations that 
contemplate criminal sanctions. They contend that regulations of this sort pose a heightened risk to 
individual liberty and that Congress must therefore provide more specific guidance. Our cases are not 
entirely clear as to whether more specific guidance is in fact required. We need not resolve the issue 
today.”) (citation omitted). 
16. After all, many penalty provisions in agency enabling acts give the government the option 
of pursuing either civil or criminal charges for the same conduct. See Ryan D. Doerfler, Can a Statute 
Have More Than One Meaning?, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 213, 243–47 (2019). 
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scholarly literature relevant to administrative crimes and observes that the primary 
argument offered against them is the intuition that criminal sanctions are uniquely 
severe, and that they therefore demand a stricter nondelegation analysis. Building 
on this, Part IV theorizes how the two most severe aspects of criminal punishment 
bear on what institution can criminalize conduct—these are the state’s power to 
express community condemnation and to deprive individuals of their liberty. 
Piecing together strands in both expressivist and liberal punishment theory, this Part 
argues that criminalization must be democratic, and that therefore administrative 
crimes are illegitimate. 
I. EXAMPLES 
Before discussing the jurisprudence that has developed regarding 
administrative crimes, it is worth discussing some concrete examples and describing 
the form of the typical offense. The definition we will use throughout this Article 
is that an administrative crime exists, at the very least, whenever a legislature creates 
an offense in which an element incorporates by reference a body of rules or 
regulations promulgated by an administrative agency. Consider the following 
formula: “It shall be an offense to [insert mens rea] violate the regulations 
promulgated by the Agency pursuant to this Title.” As this hypothetical statute 
suggests, it is usually the act element that incorporates the regulations by reference; 
it is the determination of punishable conduct that is the decision delegated to  
the Agency. 
Consider these examples from federal law: 
x White Collar Crime. Many agencies regulating business-related 
conduct are empowered by statute to promulgate regulations backed 
by criminal sanction. For example, the SEC is empowered to create 
record retention rules relating to corporate audits, and the statute 
giving the agency this power states that “[w]hoever knowingly and 
willfully violates . . . any rule or regulation promulgated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission under [this grant of authority], 
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years,  
or both.”17 
x Environmental Protection. Many federal statutes promulgate 
administrative crimes relating to environmental protection.18 For 
example, the Ocean Dumping Act makes it a criminal offense to 
“knowingly violat[e] any provision of this subchapter, [or] any 
regulation promulgated under this subchapter.”19 
 
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1520(b) (2018). 
18. Eva M. Fromm, Commanding Respect: Criminal Sanctions for Environmental Crimes, 21  
ST. MARY’S L.J. 821, 838 (1990). 
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (2012). 
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x Food and Drug Law. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibits the 
“misbranding of any food”20 and provides for up to one-year 
imprisonment for violations.21 However, the law also states that  
the “definition and standard of identity” that branding must  
adhere to is “prescribed by regulations” promulgated by the  
presidentially-appointed Secretary of Health and Human Services.22 
x Entitlement Programs. The statute creating the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (the federal food purchasing assistance program 
for low-income households) makes it a criminal offense to “us[e], 
transfe[r], acquir[e], alte[r], or posses[s] benefits in any manner 
contrary to this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this 
chapter.”23 The Secretary of Agriculture is empowered to issue  
these regulations.24 
x Wildlife Conservation. The National Wildlife Refuge System Act, which 
protects animals and plants on federal lands, creates a criminal 
offense for violations of “any of the provisions of [the] Act or any 
regulations issued thereunder.”25 
x Others. ERISA reporting regulations promulgated by the Secretary of 
Labor are backed by criminal sanction,26 as are recordkeeping 
regulations governing bank holding companies that are promulgated 
by the Federal Reserve Board.27 Regulations covering the navigation 
of water vessels, promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation, are 
also punishable as criminal offenses.28 
Now, consider some examples from state law: 
x All states operate prisons, and all prisons likely have disciplinary rules 
imposed by their administrators on inmates that result in punishment 
if violated. While technically these sanctions are called “discipline” 
and not criminal punishment, they are effectively the same. Here, 
state legislatures have delegated the decision of what conduct to 
punish in prisons to the prison administrators. For example, the New 
York Commission of the Department of Corrections and 
Community Supervision has promulgated the “Standards of Inmate 
Behavior” pursuant to this authority.29 
 
20. 21 U.S.C. § 331(b) (2018). 
21. Id. § 333(a)(1). 
22. Id. §§ 343(g), 341. 
23. 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (2018). 
24. Id. § 2013(c). 
25. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(f)(1) (2018). 
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012). 
27. 12 U.S.C. § 1956 (2018). 
28. 50 U.S.C. § 192(a)–(b) (2012). 
29. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137(2) (McKinney 2019); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7,  
§ 270.2 (2019). 
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x D.C.’s water pollution law makes it a misdemeanor offense to 
“willfully or negligently violate[ ] . . . the regulations promulgated 
pursuant to [the water pollution] subchapter.”30 
x In New York it is a misdemeanor to commit a “tax fraud act,” by 
failing to “file any return or report required under this chapter or any 
regulation promulgated under this chapter.”31 
x Florida’s law creating a public teacher retirement system states: “Any 
person subject to the terms and provisions of this chapter, including 
the individual members of all boards, who shall violate any of the 
provisions of this chapter or any valid rule or regulation promulgated 
under authority of the chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the 
second degree.”32 
x Texas oil and gas law states: “[A] person who violates any of the rules 
or orders of the governmental agency adopted under the provisions 
of this chapter on conviction is considered guilty of a felony.”33 
It is difficult to assess how numerous these administrative crimes  
are—especially in federal law. Prominent scholars, as well as the House Judiciary 
Committee, have circulated an estimate of 300,000, but the foundations of this 
estimate are questionable.34 In 1998, the ABA’s Task Force on the Federalization 
of Criminal Law lamented that “[s]o large is the present body of federal criminal law 
 
30. D.C. Code Ann. § 8-103.16(a)(1) (West 2019). 
31. N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 1801(a)(1), 1802 (McKinney 2019). 
32. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 238.16 (West 2019). 
33. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 88.134(b) (West 2019). 
34. See Press Release, House of Representatives Judiciary Comm., House Judiciary  
Comm. Reauthorizes Bipartisan Over-Criminalization Task Force (Feb. 5, 2014), https:// 
republicans-judiciary.house.gov/press-release/house-judiciary-committee-reauthorizes-bipartisan-
over-criminalization-task-force [https://perma.cc/N73R-P5MB] (“[S]tudies put the number at more 
than 300,000 – many of which, if violated, can also result in criminal liability.”). Well-known expert in 
white collar crime, Professor Julie O’Sullivan, also testified to this number before the House Judiciary 
Committee and used the number in a law review article. See Criminal Code Reform: Hearing Before the 
Over-Criminalization Task Force of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 63 (2014)  
(“Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Exactly. We do not know what the content yet is. But more seriously, I do not 
think anybody is going to count the number of criminalized regulatory offenses. I think at last count 
there were 300,000. That strikes me as crazy.”); Julie Rose O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal  
“Code”: Return of Overfederalization, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 58 (2014) (“Some estimate that 
federal agencies have generated hundreds of thousands of criminally-enforceable regulations.”). 
O’Sullivan’s citation for this number in turn relies on the prominent environmental law scholar Richard 
Lazarus. Id. at 58 n.7. Lazarus states that “[a]n estimated 300,000 federal regulations are now subject 
to criminal enforcement.” Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of 
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2441–42 (1995). 
Lazarus’s source is John Coffee. Id. at 2442 n.168. Coffee bases his estimate on comments “made by 
Stanley Arkin, a well-known practitioner in the field of white collar crime, at the George Mason 
Conference in October 1990.” John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on 
the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 216 n.94 (1991). The 
source of Arkin’s claim is unknown. Thus, the oft-cited estimate of 300,000 administrative crimes has 
no verifiable basis. 
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that there is no conveniently accessible, complete list of federal crimes.”35 The 
complexity of recognizing administrative crime provisions outside of the general 
criminal law title (Title 18) was a major reason for this inability to make an accurate 
accounting: “A large number of sanctions are dispersed throughout the thousands 
of administrative ‘regulations’ promulgated by the various governmental agencies 
under Congressional statutory authorization. Nearly 10,000 regulations mention 
some sort of sanction, many clearly criminal in nature, while many others are 
designated ‘civil.’”36 While a precise count has not been ascertained, what no one 
disagrees about is that the number of administrative crimes is substantial. 
Administrative regulations backed by criminal sanctions cover wide ranges of 
conduct and multiply in the background through the rulemaking process. 
II. JUDICIAL RECEPTION 
A. Federal Law 
The seminal case addressing the validity of administrative crimes is the 1918 
U.S. Supreme Court decision of United States v. Grimaud.37 Grimaud involved a 
conviction “for grazing sheep on the Sierra Forest Reserve without having obtained 
the permission required by the regulations adopted by the Secretary of 
Agriculture.”38 A federal statute had delegated rulemaking authority to the Secretary 
and made violations of those rules criminal offenses.39 The Court noted that the 
general purpose of the statute was to protect and manage forest reservations, but 
that the choice of whether a specific reservation would allow a specific activity was 
merely a “matter of administrative detail,” as “it was impracticable for Congress to 
provide general regulations for these various and varying details of management” 
given the “peculiar and special features” of each reservation.40 The Court wrote that 
by empowering the Secretary to adapt his regulations to “local conditions,” 
“Congress was merely conferring administrative functions upon an agent, and not 
delegating to him legislative power.”41 The Court referred to an older case involving 
court rules and stated that while “strictly and exclusively legislative” powers could 
not be delegated, “nonlegislative” powers to “fill up the details” of a statute were 
 
35. James A. Strazzella, Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law, 1998  
A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. 9, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
criminaljustice/Federalization_of_Criminal_Law.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SFY-67UB] 
( last visited Dec. 28, 2019). 
36. Id. at 9–10. 
37. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). 
38. Id. at 514. 
39. Id. at 515 (“[T]he Secretary ‘may make such rules and regulations and establish such service 
as will insure the objects of such reservations; namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to 
preserve the forests thereon from destruction; and any violation of the provisions of this act or such rules 
and regulations shall be punished.’”). 
40. Id. at 516. 
41. Id. 
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permissibly delegated.42 Exclusively legislative powers were “important subjects,” 
but those subjects of “less interest”—the “details”—were the province of 
administrative regulations.43 
While the initial justification for the delegation appears to be variability (in this 
case, the peculiar features of different reservations), in the end variability of 
circumstances represents just one species of a larger category: the “details.” Grimaud 
continues by giving other examples of mere “details”: ratemaking in shipping and 
determining the uniform height of railroad-car couplings.44 The determination of 
details like these “administer the law and carry the statute into effect.”45 Later the 
concept is described in more depth, when the Court quotes from some prior 
delegation cases outside of the criminal context: Congress may delegate “a power 
to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to 
make its own action depend,” as “there are many things upon which wise and useful 
legislation must depend which cannot be known to the lawmaking power.”46 
“Details” are “known unknowns” at the time of the legislative enactment, and their 
specification effectuates the legislative intent. 
After Grimaud, the coming of the New Deal and the rise of the administrative 
state would result in a greatly increased number of administrative crimes as the 20th 
century progressed.47 The Grimaud holding would remain undisturbed at the 
Supreme Court, though.48 
One flicker of dissent emerged from Justice Brennan in his concurrence in the 
1967 case United States v. Robel.49 Robel involved a conviction pursuant to the 
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, which prohibited any member of a 
Communist organization from “engag[ing] in any employment in a defense 
facility.”50 The determination of what constituted a “defense facility” was delegated 
to the Secretary of Defense.51 The Court struck down the offense on freedom of 
 
42. Id. at 517. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 517–18. 
45. Id. at 518. 
46. Id. at 520. 
47. For a discussion of this era and criminal lawmaking, see generally Mila Sohoni, Notice and 
the New Deal, 62 DUKE L.J. 1169 (2013). 
48. A case that is exemplary of this era is the 1944 decision in Yakus v. United States, 321  
U.S. 414, 424–25 (1944). In Yakus, the defendants were convicted of selling beef above the maximum 
price regulation specified by the “Price Administrator,” and these regulations were backed by a criminal 
sanction pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act. Id. at 418. This was an emergency regulatory 
regime passed during the height of World War II and was set to expire on its own terms by mid-1944. 
Id. at 419–20. In upholding the law, the Court took note of the fact that these regulations had criminal 
sanctions, but this feature seemed to be of no import: “The essentials of the legislative function are the 
determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding 
rule of conduct—here the rule, with penal sanctions . . . will tend to further the policy which Congress 
has established.” Id. at 424. The “penal sanctions” clause of that sentence seems to be an afterthought. 
49. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 273–74 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
50. Id. at 259–60. 
51. Id. at 260. 
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association grounds, but Justice Brennan’s concurrence raised the additional issue 
of the Secretary’s role in determining criminal liability.52 Brennan, of course, was no 
opponent of the administrative state, and began his opinion by re-affirming his 
belief that lax enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine was generally 
appropriate.53 The difference in this case, though, was that the Secretary effectively 
defined administrative crimes.54 What makes criminal sanctions unique is their 
especially harsh effect of liberty deprivation: “[T]he numerous deficiencies 
connected with vague legislative directives,” Brennan wrote, “are far more serious 
when liberty and the exercise of fundamental rights are at stake.”55 
This special aspect of the criminal sanction meant that it should only be 
imposed by a legislature—only after “legislative judgment” on “formulation of 
policy.”56 The problem with delegated policy formulation is that policy formulation 
is “entrusted to [Congress] by the electorate,” and that administrative agencies are 
“often not answerable or responsive in the same degree to the people,” and 
therefore they lack the “authority” to decide such questions.57 Congress is the 
“appropriate forum where conflicting pros and cons should have been presented 
and considered.”58 Brennan’s vision of legislative judgment is thus grounded in 
democratic legitimacy through electoral accountability (“authority”), with the 
acknowledgement that many decisions will have competing reasons for different 
actions (“pros and cons”) requiring democratic deliberation.59 
 
52. Id. at 261; see also id. at 272 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
53. See id. at 274 (“No other general rule would be feasible or desirable. Delegation of power 
under general directives is an inevitable consequence of our complex society, with its myriad, ever 
changing, highly technical problems.”). 
54. See id. at 275 (“The area of permissible indefiniteness narrows, however, when the regulation 
invokes criminal sanctions and potentially affects fundamental rights, as does [this law].”). 
55. Id.; see also id. at 277 (“The need for a legislative judgment is especially acute here, since it is 
imperative when liberty and the exercise of fundamental freedoms are involved that constitutional rights 
not be unduly infringed.”). 
56. Id. at 282. Brennan also raised a form of a notice rationale. United States v. Robel, 389  
U.S. 258, 281 (1967) (“Third. The indefiniteness of the delegation in this case also results in inadequate 
notice to affected persons. Although the form of notice provided for in s 5(b) affords affected persons 
reasonable opportunity to conform their behavior to avoid punishment, it is not enough that persons 
engaged in arguably protected activity be reasonably well advised that their actions are subject to 
regulation. Persons so engaged must not be compelled to conform their behavior to commands, no 
matter how unambiguous, from delegated agents whose authority to issue the commands is unclear 
. . . . The legislative directive must delineate the scope of the agent’s authority so that those affected by 
the agent’s commands may know that his command is within his authority and is not his own arbitrary 
fiat . . . . There is no way for persons affected by s 5(a)(1)(D) to know whether the Secretary is acting 
within his authority, and therefore no fair basis upon which they may determine whether or not to risk 
disobedience in the exercise of activities normally protected.”). 
57. Id. at 276. 
58. Id. 
59. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275–77 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Such 
congressional determinations will not be assumed. ‘They must be made explicitly not only to assure that 
individuals are not deprived of cherished rights under procedures not actually authorized . . . but also 
because explicit action, especially in areas of doubtful constitutionality, requires careful and purposeful 
consideration by those responsible for enacting and implementing our laws.’”). Consider also this 
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Despite Brennan’s arguments, the consensus on administrative crimes was not 
even called into question by the Court until almost twenty-five years later. In 1991, 
co-defendants challenged the scheme created by the Controlled Substances Act in 
Touby v. United States.60 The Act established five categories of substances and 
punished unauthorized manufacture, possession, and distribution of these 
substances, but authorized the Attorney General to add or remove substances from 
the various categories.61 The Attorney General in turn delegated his authority to the 
Drug Enforcement Administration’s administrator.62 The defendants in the case 
challenged these delegations as unconstitutional, arguing that the nondelegation 
doctrine requires greater statutory specificity with respect to prohibited conduct 
when the regulations promulgated under the statute carry criminal sanctions.63 The 
Court did not outright reject this claim. Instead, citing Grimaud, the Court 
acknowledged that its cases “[a]re not entirely clear as to whether more specific 
guidance” is required for regulations that function as criminal offenses, but that 
“even if greater congressional specificity is required in the criminal context,” the 
Controlled Substances Act is sufficiently specific.64 Crucial to this determination 
was that the Act imposed daunting procedural requirements on the Attorney 
General’s power to add and remove substances from the restricted categories.65 
These “specific restrictions on the Attorney General’s discretion” saved the 
Controlled Substances Act from unconstitutionality,66 despite the fact that the 
restrictions on the discretion were purely procedural. Congress did not define or limit 
what is or is not an unlawful substance. 
Justice Marshall’s concurrence (joined by Blackmun) in Touby indicates that 
despite his vote, he was somewhat troubled by administrative crimes.67 For 
Marshall, judicial review of the Agency’s decision was crucial to the constitutionality 
of the Controlled Substances Act’s delegation due to its criminal nature: 
Because of the severe impact of criminal laws on individual liberty . . . an 
opportunity to challenge a delegated lawmaker’s compliance with 
congressional directives is a constitutional necessity when administrative 
standards are enforced by criminal law . . . . We must therefore read the 
Controlled Substances Act as preserving judicial review of a temporary 
 
passage from Justice Brennan’s opinion in a 1984 void-for-vagueness case: “The requirement that 
government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of clarity ensures that state power will be 
exercised only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative choice among competing social 
values . . . .” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984). 
60. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 167 (1991). 
61. Id. at 162. 
62. Id. at 164. 
63. Id. at 162. 
64. Id. at 166. 
65. Id. at 167 (“It is clear that in §§ 201(h) and 202(b) Congress has placed multiple specific 
restrictions on the Attorney General’s discretion to define criminal conduct. These restrictions satisfy 
the constitutional requirements of the nondelegation doctrine.”). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 169–70. 
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scheduling order in the course of a criminal prosecution in order to save 
the Act’s delegation of lawmaking power from unconstitutionality.68 
For Marshall, like for Brennan, the especially harsh effects of criminalization 
(liberty deprivation) justified a different analysis than did the typical delegation case, 
yet for Marshall it was not legislative specificity that saved these laws, but  
judicial review. 
While Touby seemed to have been an expression of a potential need for greater 
specificity in criminal delegations, only five years later these concerns evaporated. 
In the 1996 case of Loving v. United States, a criminal defendant challenged the 
President’s power to specify aggravating factors for military capital punishment 
pursuant to a Congressional delegation.69 In the opinion the Court explicitly  
re-affirmed the validity of administrative crimes, and cited to Grimaud: 
There is no absolute rule . . . against Congress’ delegation of authority to 
define criminal punishments. We have upheld delegations whereby the 
Executive or an independent agency defines by regulation what conduct 
will be criminal, so long as Congress makes the violation of regulations a 
criminal offense and fixes the punishment, and the regulations “confin[e] 
themselves within the field covered by the statute.”70 
Loving interprets Grimaud quite expansively, and as imposing only two 
requirements. The penalty must be in the statutory text, and the regulations must 
be inside the “field covered” by that text. While Grimaud spoke of agencies “fill[ing] 
up the details” that would be “unknown” at the time of legislative deliberation but 
necessary to “carry the statute into effect,” Loving views statutes as creating a “field” 
within which regulations were free to operate.71 
 
68. Id. at 170. 
69. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996). Loving is different from the previous cases in 
two respects. First, it is a delegation with respect to sentencing and not substantive criminal liability. 
Moreover, it is a delegation to the President, and not to one of his or her executive agencies. 
70. Id. at 754 (citing United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911)). 
71. The quote from Grimaud referencing this “field” comes from the discussion in that case of 
prior decisions upholding non-criminal administrative delegations. 
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For over twenty years after Loving there was little attention paid to the issue 
of administrative crimes,72 but in 2019 the Court decided Gundy v. United States.73 
In Gundy the petitioner challenged the delegations to the Attorney General in the 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act,74 which empowered that official 
to determine the retroactivity of registration requirements that were backed by 
criminal sanctions.75 The plurality opinion avoided the constitutional issue by 
reading into the statute an “intelligible principle” that saved it from  
invalidation—that the Attorney General should register “pre-Act offenders as soon 
as feasible.”76 The criminal nature of the regulatory delegation was barely mentioned 
by the plurality, and Touby was not cited.77 
However, three justices agreed that the statute violated the nondelegation 
doctrine, with Justice Gorsuch writing the dissent.78 The dissenters, like the 
plurality, analyzed the issue as one of delegated lawmaking more generally; they did 
not make explicit their agreement with Touby’s suggestion that administrative crimes 
might be a special case requiring stricter standards.79 For the dissenters, all 
 
72. One brief discussion occurs in a 2014 statement respecting the denial of a certiorari petition, 
written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice Thomas. Whitman v. United States, 574 U.S. 1003, 1004 
(2014) (mem.). In the case, Scalia criticized the lower court for giving Chevron deference to the SEC’s 
interpretation of “fraud” in the federal criminal code, arguing that this “collide[s] with the norm that 
legislatures, not executive officers, define crimes.” Id. at 1004. However, while Scalia argued that this 
principle militated against deference, it did not rule out administrative criminalization: “Undoubtedly 
Congress may make it a crime to violate a regulation . . . .” Id. But if the animating principle behind the 
no-deference-in-criminal-law rule is similarly the principle that only legislatures “define crimes,” then 
Scalia ought not have concluded that Grimaud-type delegations are “undoubtedly” constitutional. Why 
is it worse to accord an agency deference when it interprets a legislatively specified offense element than 
it is for the legislature to import wholesale the offense elements created by administrative rule? This 
distinction seems empty and formalistic. In both cases, the jury will be instructed on, and the 
prosecution must prove, elements that are not legislatively determined. In fact, for delegation purposes 
the Whitman-type deference delegation seems less egregious than the Grimaud-type rule-incorporation 
delegation—in the case of the former, the legislature has more precisely spoken regarding the elements 
of the offense. For another discussion of this issue by a well-regarded circuit judge, see Carter  
v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 731 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (“By giving 
unelected commissioners and directors and administrators carte blanche to decide when an ambiguous 
statute justifies sending people to prison, the government’s theory diminishes this ideal.”). 
73. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 2123. 
77. Id. at 2116. 
78. Id. at 2131. 
79. Id. at 2133. Perhaps it is best to characterize the dissent as viewing criminal law delegations 
as the worst of a category that is unconstitutional more generally—not unconstitutional specifically 
because of its criminal sanctions. The dissenters seem most concerned with the fact that the delegation 
is made to a criminal law enforcement agent (the Attorney General), not that a violation of the AG’s 
regulations is a criminal offense. “The Constitution promises that only the people’s elected 
representatives may adopt new federal laws restricting liberty. Yet the statute before us scrambles that 
design. It purports to endow the nation’s chief prosecutor with the power to write his own criminal 
code governing the lives of a half-million citizens.” Id. at 2131; see also id. at 2144–45 (“To allow the 
nation’s chief law enforcement officer to write the criminal laws he is charged with enforcing—to 
‘unit[e]’ the ‘legislative and executive powers . . . in the same person’—would be to mark the end of any 
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delegations, no matter the sanction, were unconstitutional. Their argument—based 
on an original understanding of separation of powers—was buttressed by 
functionalist claims validating the wisdom of that understanding. Lawmaking 
should be “difficult” because impediments to legislation: (1) “limit the 
government’s capacity to restrict people’s freedoms,” (2) “promote deliberation,” 
(3) “guard unpopular minorities from the tyranny of the majority,” (4) maintain “a 
relatively stable and predictable set of rules,” and (5) “ensure that the lines of 
accountability would be clear.”80 Of these justifications, (1), (3), and (4) seem most 
salient for criminal laws, but the connection is not made explicit in the opinion. 
The federal position on administrative crimes, and on delegation more 
generally, may change in the future. Justice Alito’s concurrence in Gundy indicated 
that he would be willing to “reconsider the approach” the Court has taken on 
nondelegation claims if “a majority of this Court were [also] willing.”81 With the 
addition of Justice Kavanaugh to the Court, the Grimaud consensus may be 
threatened. For now, though, it remains. 
B. State Law 
Having assessed the state of the law with respect to the federal nondelegation 
doctrine, we now turn to the positions of state courts interpreting state constitutions 
or statutes. Fortunately, we need not break new ground. Jim Rossi undertook an 
exhaustive survey of state nondelegation doctrines in 1999; given all that has been 
said in the previous section, his results were surprising.82 The majority of state high 
courts have not followed the Supreme Court’s lax interpretation of nondelegation. 
Overall, Rossi concludes that “in the states, unlike the federal system, the 
nondelegation doctrine is alive and well.”83 
Rossi identifies only six states that are, like the federal jurisdiction, “weak” 
nondelegation states that “uphold[ ] legislative delegations as long as the Agency has 
adequate procedural safeguards in place” (think Touby).84 These can be contrasted 
with twenty “strong” nondelegation states where “statutes are periodically struck on 
 
meaningful enforcement of our separation of powers and invite the tyranny of the majority that follows 
when lawmaking and law enforcement responsibilities are united in the same hands.”) (citations 
omitted). According to this logic, it would be less egregious for Congress to delegate criminal 
rulemaking power to, say, the EPA Administrator, with violations then prosecuted by the DOJ. 
80. Id. at 2133–35. 
81. Id. at 2131. 
82. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers 
Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1187 (1999). Rossi’s remains the most current assessment. 
83. Id. at 1189. He notes that this is true from the standpoint of the law in 1999. Rossi’s 
assessment of the causes of this is interesting. He attributes the difference between the state and federal 
systems to be due to the “unique institutional design of state systems of governance.” Id. at 1217. “State 
legislatures, and often agencies, are more prone to faction than the U.S. Congress or federal agencies, 
both because the costs of organizing and mobilizing local factions are lower and because state 
legislatures, in session for very limited terms, are not as effective as Congress at oversight.” Id. at  
1227–28. 
84. Id. at 1191. 
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nondelegation grounds.”85 These strong nondelegation states “differ both in 
doctrine and in enforcement from their federal counterparts.”86 In these states the 
doctrine is actually enforced, and the doctrine itself often stems from explicit textual 
requirements in the state constitution. As Rossi notes, “The overwhelming majority 
of modern state constitutions contain a strict separation of powers clause,” meaning 
that there is explicit constitutional text dividing power between the various 
branches, and also a provision that “instructs that one branch is not to exercise the 
powers of any of the others.”87 In “strong” nondelegation states, this text is 
operative and is enforced by the state high court; the result is a requirement of 
“specific standards and guidelines in legislation to validate a delegation of legislative 
authority to an agency.”88 
Somewhere between the strong and weak nondelegation states are what Rossi 
calls the “moderate” nondelegation states.89 These twenty-three states “vary the 
degree of standards necessary depending on the subject matter of the statute or the 
scope of the statutory directive,” but rarely uphold delegations solely on the basis 
of “procedural safeguards.”90 Rossi writes that while some of these state courts have 
adopted doctrinal language similar to the U.S. Supreme Court, the state courts are 
“much more likely to strike down statutes as unconstitutional.”91 Similarities in 
doctrine belie differences in enforcement levels.92 
Before moving on, it is worth looking at some examples of the different 
positions that states have taken. In what follows, consider representative opinions 
from state high courts—one, from a weak nondelegation state approving 
administrative crimes, and a second from a strong nondelegation state reaching the 
opposite conclusion. 
1. Arizona: Weak Nondelegation 
One example of a “weak” nondelegation state, similar to the federal system, is 
Arizona.93 In the 1978 case State v. Williams, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld a 
 
85. Id. at 1196–97. While Rossie lists Arizona as a strong nondelegation state, I believe that this 
must be a typographical error. He cites to the case discussed below as exemplifying Arizona’s approach, 
but as should be apparent, this case endorses broad delegations. 
86. Id. at 1197. 
87. Id. at 1190. 
88. Id. at 1195. 
89. Id. at 1198. 
90. Id. at 1198–200. 
91. Id. at 1200. 
92. Id. 
93. See, e.g., People v. Turmon, 340 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Mich. 1983) (“[T]he power to define 
crimes, unlike some legislative powers, need not be exercised exclusively and completely by the 
Legislature. Provided sufficient standards and safeguards are included in the statutory scheme, 
delegation to an executive agency is appropriate, and often necessary, for the effectuation of  
legislative powers.”). 
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conviction for an administratively defined crime relating to food stamp fraud.94 The 
defendant falsely claimed that she was unemployed so as to keep receiving the food 
stamps, in violation of regulations of the State’s Department of Economic Security, 
an administrative agency.95 Violation of the Agency’s regulations was made a 
misdemeanor by statute: “Whoever knowingly . . . acquires . . . food stamps . . . in 
any manner not authorized by law is guilty of a misdemeanor.”96 “Authorized by 
law” was interpreted to include regulations promulgated by the Department.97 
The court began its analysis by noting the Arizona constitution’s general 
approach to nondelegation questions, which is similarly permissive like the federal 
approach. “Delegation of ‘quasi-legislative’ powers to administrative agencies, 
authorizing them to make rules and regulations, within proper standards fixed by 
the legislature, are normally sustained as valid,” the court reasoned, “and, barring a 
total abdication of their legislative powers, there is no real constitutional prohibition 
against the delegation of a large measure of authority to an administrative agency 
for the administration of a statute enacted pursuant to a state’s police power.”98 
Only “total abdication” presents a state constitutional law problem. Interestingly, 
though, the court views this statute as avoiding a delegation problem altogether: 
It should be noted that [the statute] does not delegate any power 
whatsoever in the sense of authorizing another governmental body to 
create rules or regulations. Rather, the [statute] merely incorporates into 
the criminal law of Arizona, by the process of providing penalties for their 
violation, rules and regulations of various governmental agencies.99 
The court saw a distinction between delegating power to create criminal 
offenses and assigning a criminal sanction to a rule created by a non-criminal-law 
delegation. While this seems purely formalistic, the opinion does contain strains of 
a functionalist justification for this deferential approach: “[a]pparently on the theory 
that the Legislature exercises complete dominion over its own agencies, it has long 
been established that the Legislature is empowered to provide criminal sanctions 
for violations of any legitimate rule or regulation . . . that it has otherwise authorized 
the agency to promulgate.”100 Thus, the continuing oversight of the Legislature 
justifies the delegation; legislative inaction is effectively acquiescence, given the 
Legislature’s ability to reverse agency action. 
 
94.   State v. Williams, 583 P.2d 251, 252 (Ariz. 1978); see also State v. Alfonso, 753 So.2d 156  
(La. 1999). 
95.   Williams, 583 P.2d at 252. 
96.   Id. 
97.   Id. 
98.   Id. at 254. 
99.   Id. 
100. Id. at 255 (citing State v. Anklam, 31 P.2d 888 (Ariz. 1934); State v. Phelps, 467 P.2d 923 
(Ariz. Ct. App.1970)). 
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2. Florida: Strong Nondelegation 
Now, consider a more recent opinion from a strong nondelegation  
state—Florida.101 In B.H. v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida assessed the validity 
of a criminal offense punishing “[a]n escape from any secure [juvenile] detention 
facility or any residential commitment facility of restrictiveness level [six] or 
above.”102 The restrictiveness level of a facility was then delegated to the 
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, an administrative agency.103 The 
only limits placed on the Agency’s discretion to determine a facility’s restrictiveness 
was that the categories must be based on “the risk and needs of the individual child,” 
and that there could be no more than eight categories.104 
The Florida Supreme Court struck down this offense on nondelegation 
grounds.105 In its discussion of federal nondelegation law, the court cited to 
Grimaud, as well as a number of law review articles.106 The Florida court summarized 
the scholarly consensus on the state of federal law to be one of “stern[ ]” 
“critici[sm],” and highlighted seminal figures in intellectual history (Locke and 
Montesquieu) who posited the value of the separation of legislative and executive 
powers.107 Having criticized the federal approach to nondelegation, the court turned 
to Florida law and began with a recognition of a “‘strict’ separation” provision in 
the state constitution: 
Pursuant to their inherent powers, the people of Florida have established 
a tripartite separation of powers precisely like that envisioned by Locke and 
Montesquieu: “The powers of the state government shall be divided into 
legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch 
shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly 
provided herein.” Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. (emphasis added).108 
 
101. See e.g., People v. Holmes, 959 P.2d 406, 410 (Colo. 1998) (“‘It is a fundamental principle 
that only the General Assembly may declare an act to be a crime and that power may not be delegated 
to persons not elected by nor responsible to the People . . . .’ We carefully scrutinize a statutory scheme 
that establishes criminal penalties for violation of administrative rules because such a delegation 
implicates an important liberty interest, including the right to reasonable notice of that conduct deemed 
criminal . . . . A statute must prescribe standards sufficient to guide and to circumscribe an 
administrative officer’s authority to declare conduct criminal.”) (quoting People v. Lepik, 629 P.2d 
1080, 1082 (Colo. 1982)); Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 104 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Neb. 1960) (“[The public] 
may properly assume that crimes and punishment are purely a legislative function and that the 
definition of all crimes and the punishment therefor[e] will be found in the duly enacted statutes of this 
state. The public may properly rely on the fact that the Legislature meets only at stated intervals and 
that criminal laws may be enacted, amended, and repealed only during such legislative sessions.”). 
102. B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 989 (Fla. 1994). 
103. Id. at 989–90. 
104. Id. at 994. 
105. Id. at 987. 
106. Id. at 990. 
107. Id. at 991. 
108. Id. 
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This textual distinction from the U.S. Constitution provided Florida with a 
basis for “expressly and repeatedly” repudiating the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
nondelegation jurisprudence.109 
According to the Florida court, nondelegation concerns are at their apex in 
criminal law matters—these involve authority of a “different magnitude” from a 
typical delegation.110 This is because “the power to create crimes and punishments 
in derogation of the common law inheres solely in the democratic processes of the 
legislative branch,” and also because due process in criminal law requires notice of 
prohibited acts.111 The upshot of these principles is that 
all challenged delegations in the criminal context must expressly or tacitly 
rest on a legislatively determined fundamental policy; and the delegations also 
must expressly articulate reasonably definite standards of implementation 
that do not merely grant open-ended authority, but that impose an actual 
limit—both minimum and maximum—on what the agency may do.112  
The statute authorizing HRS to determine restrictiveness levels failed this test, 
as it provided no limits on the Agency’s discretion. The Florida Supreme Court 
thought it was especially problematic that the Agency appeared to be using its 
discretion to game the statutory system: HRS did not create 8 restrictiveness levels 
as it was empowered to do so, but instead created four levels “using only even 
numbers,” resulting in “2 (nonresidential), 4 (low-risk residential), 6 (moderate-risk 
residential), and 8 (high-risk residential).”113 The court appeared to be scandalized 
by the ability of the Agency to simply skip odd numbers in a way that affected 
whether the offense definition (above “VI”) was triggered or not: “the fact that 
HRS skipped odd numbers indicates that the agency felt it could have adopted 
virtually any numbering system it chose,” and had it wanted to “HRS might have 
designated the four levels respectively as 10, 20, 30, and 40,” thus including all 
facilities within the statutory definition.114 The statute here is especially odd in that 
it references a numerical category of restrictiveness, but provides no guidance or 
limits on whether that number will be adopted within the numbering scheme chose 
by the Agency. 
In re B.H. provides an excellent example of a strong nondelegation state 
enforcing its doctrine in the context of criminal law. The Florida Supreme Court 
drew on a concern for democratic decision-making through legislative enactments, 
as well as the notice values demanded by due process. 
 
109. Id. at 992. 
110. Id. at 993. 
111. Id. at 992 (quoting Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (Fla. 1991)) (first citing Jeffries 
v. State, 610 So. 2d 440, 411 (Fla. 1992); and then citing Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310, 1312  
(Fla. 1991)). 
112. B.H., 645 So. 2d at 994. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
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III. SCHOLARLY RECEPTION 
As we have seen, administrative crimes have an established place in federal 
constitutional law, and also in the jurisprudence of some states. The impressive 
pedigree of administrative crimes at the U.S. Supreme Court, though, has not 
immunized them from criticism. But this literature is relatively small.115 
Perhaps the first scholarly response to administrative crimes came in  
1943—before the expansive conception of nondelegation took on its canonical 
status. German scholar Edmund Schwenk noted the rising trend in the creation of 
administrative crimes and wrote an apologetic defense of their use.116 Schwenk 
observed that administrative crimes seemed different from typical crimes as they 
were “not the outbirth of a particular unmoral conduct, but [were] characterized by 
disobedience to administrative duties,” and that the “function” of these offenses 
was “deterrence rather than retribution.”117 Because this is punishment “not to 
vindicate past conduct, but to enforce future conduct,” administrative crimes had 
“nothing to do with the ordinary concept of crime.”118 
However, he does not back down from the conceptualization of these offenses 
as truly penal.119 Schwenk is aware of the most obvious critique of such a  
practice—that “[t]he power of creating either the elements or the penalty of a crime 
results in more serious consequences for the individual than the power to issue rules 
and regulations which are vested merely with civil or administrative liability.”120 This 
critique he dismisses in cryptic fashion: “Th[is] argument . . . is of a psychological 
rather than legal nature.”121 
It would be over thirty years before the next sustained scholarly assessment of 
administrative crimes—a 1976 article by Harlan Abrahams and John Snowden.122 
 
115. This is curious given the extremely vast body of commentary on the nondelegation 
doctrine more generally. As Rachel Barkow has observed, criminal law has not received much attention 
in debates about separation of powers: “[S]cholars have failed to treat criminal law as a separate category 
for analysis. Instead, questions involving the oversight of the administrative and regulatory state have 
tended to dominate the discussion . . . .” Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 
58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 993 (2006). 
116. Edmund H. Schwenk, The Administrative Crime, Its Creation and Punishment by 
Administrative Agencies, 42 MICH. L. REV. 51 (1943). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 86. 
119. Id. (“Even though punishment as an administrative sanction should be employed, there 
always would remain a proper field for the use of the administrative crime as a penal sanction.”). 
120. Id. at 52. 
121. Id. at 54. 
122. Harlan S. Abrahams & John R. Snowden, Separation of Powers and Administrative  
Crimes: A Study of Irreconcilables, 1 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1 (1976). Consider their helpful typology: 
Accordingly, the following five types of cases are analyzed: (A) those where the agency is 
allowed to determine in the first instance whether violations of its regulations should be 
sanctioned criminally; (B) those where the legislature assigns rulemaking power to agencies 
and itself provides criminal sanctions for violation of the rules, enforceable by judicial 
process; (C) those where the statute not only declares violation of administrative rules to be 
criminal, but also empowers the agencies to fix by regulation the amount of the fines within 
statutory limits; (D) those where the statute sets forth the sanction generally but delegates 
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While Schwenk’s defense came during the heyday of the expansion of the 
administrative state, Abrahams and Snowden were writing after the rise of agency 
capture theory; their assessment was, perhaps predictably, less positive.123 Overall, 
Snowden and Abrahams’ critique seems to be a formalist one. They emphasize that 
a paradigmatic function of a branch must be performed by that branch in order for 
the action to have “the requisite degree of legitimacy,” but do not explain what they 
mean by legitimacy.124 However, they briefly nod towards the criticism that 
highlights the distinctive severity of the criminal sanction: “[O]nly in connection 
with [a criminal] proceeding will [an offender’s] status as a wrongdoer invoke certain 
attitudinal values of the community.”125 
A 1992 student note by Mark Alexander addressed the issue of administrative 
crimes, but in the context of determining the appropriate level of judicial deference 
when reviewing the Agency’s criminal rulemaking.126 In arguing for the need for 
heightened scrutiny of criminal agency rules, though, Alexander grounds his analysis 
in the distinctive nature of criminal sanctions more generally: “The criminal penalty 
represents the ultimate governmental intrusion on individual freedom, together 
with a sense of community approbation not present in other government action.”127 
Last to consider is a very recent commentary offered by A.J. Kritikos.128 
Drawing on the arguments employed by then-Judge Gorsuch in a Tenth Circuit 
case, as well as the Florida Supreme Court in In re B.H., Kritikos proposes that the 
non-delegation doctrine be “resuscitated” in the criminal context.129 The reasons 
for this are unsurprising, and he repeats arguments discussed above regarding the 
severity of criminal sanctions. There is a “special need to protect citizens from 
arbitrary power when their life and liberty are at stake,” he writes, and “the stakes 
of getting the law right are . . . high” with criminal punishment.130 Later, he 
reiterates that “separation of powers principles . . . are especially vital to 
governmental legitimacy when life and personal liberty are at stake.”131 Because 
criminal punishment is “the most significant power wielded by the State,” the state’s 
“authority to enforce criminal penalties should be entirely clear.”132 
 
to the agency the job of adjudicating violations and imposing the penalties; and (E) those 
involving administrative imprisonments. 
Id. at 111. 
123. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT  
L. REV. 1039 (1997); John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99  
HARV. L. REV. 713, 723–25 (1986). 
124. Id. at 9, 36. 
125. Id. at 9. 
126. Mark D. Alexander, Note, Increased Judicial Scrutiny for the Administrative Crime, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 612, 649 (1992). 
127. Id. at 614 (footnote omitted). 
128. A.J. Kritikos, Resuscitating the Non-Delegation Doctrine: A Compromise and an Experiment, 
82 MO. L. REV. 441, 482 (2017). 
129. Id. at 477. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 482. 
132. Id. 
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Before moving on, it is worth addressing two influential theories of delegation 
and separation of powers in criminal law. While these theories do not directly 
discuss administrative crimes, the theories have clear implications for the desirability 
of these type of offenses. 
Consider first Dan Kahan’s theory that the Department of Justice should 
receive Chevron deference when interpreting federal criminal law—a theory 
premised on a robust argument that delegation to the executive in criminal law has 
“immense” benefits.133 Kahan begins by claiming that a criminal code defined 
purely by the legislature is an “imaginary regime” given the “deliberate 
incompleteness” of federal criminal statutes and that therefore most  
crime-definition takes place in the judiciary.134 There is, then, a regime of delegation 
already in place, but the current delegate (the judiciary) is inferior to the other choice 
(the executive).135 The executive branch, unlike the judges, is “more likely to be 
consistent,” “has more experience with criminal law enforcement,” and “is 
ultimately accountable to the people.”136 Changing the delegate to the executive 
would also “enhance notice” and “constrain arbitrary and partisan behavior by 
individual prosecutors,” thus advancing “rule of law” values.137 
While Kahan’s theory is presented primarily as a choice between two 
delegates,138 he also presents an affirmative account of the value of delegation more 
generally, describing the “advantages of delegation” as “immense” and 
“systemic.”139 He writes, “Delegation—whether express or implied, whether to 
agencies or courts—is a strategy for maximizing Congress’s policymaking influence 
in the face of constraints on its power to make law.”140 The most significant 
constraint for Kahan is “political”: “The difficulty of generating consensus on 
politically charged issues can easily stifle legislation, particularly criminal 
legislation.”141 Thus, delegation promotes “efficiency” in criminal lawmaking; 
“[d]elegated criminal law costs less than legislatively specified criminal law and is 
more effective to boot.”142 A system of purely-legislatively “specified” crimes 
imposes “high practical and political costs” in that Congress is forced to “specif[y] 
 
133. Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1996). 
134. Id. at 470. 
135. Id. (We must “change the identity of the delegate.”). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 471. 
138. Id. at 470 (He aims to “the benefits of delegated criminal law-making” while “avoiding  
the costs.”). 
139. Id. at 488. 
140. Id. at 474. 
141. Id. He also notes time limitations. Id. at 475 (“Criminal law-making, in this respect, 
confronts members of Congress with high opportunity costs: time spent enacting criminal legislation 
necessarily comes at the expense of time that could be spent enacting legislation sought by small, highly 
organized interest groups, which are more likely than the public at large to reward legislators for benefits 
conferred and to punish them for disabilities imposed. Again, one solution is highly general (even purely 
symbolic) criminal legislation, which takes little time to enact and which is likely to be sufficient to 
satisfy the public’s demand for criminal law.”) (footnote omitted). 
142. Id. at 481. 
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each of [the] prohibitions itself,” and due to higher costs there will be “reduced 
output” of criminal legislation.143 Delegation is also more efficient in that it 
facilitates the updating of criminal codes with new technology and behavior,144 and 
in closing loopholes that emerge from experience in the code’s application.145 
Kahan takes seriously the problem of gridlock on criminal issues, emphasizing, 
“[t]hese are real social costs.”146 Reduced “output” in criminal law seems like a 
strange concern in today’s era of overcriminalization and mass incarceration, but 
given his underlying theory of legislation, Kahan’s point is a valid one. “I am 
assuming here that efficiency in criminal law-making is good,” he writes, and 
grounds this claim in a deeper “pragmatic conception” of separation of powers that 
mostly “leave[s] institutions free to converge on allocations of authority that 
maximize the power of government to pursue collective ends.”147 If criminal law 
can help to advance social welfare, then institutional structures that prevent it from 
being enacted are deleterious. 
Kahan addresses the most obvious critique of his scheme head on—tension 
with democracy. He argues that “[t]he law is likely to be closer in quantity and quality 
to what the public demands when [delegates], at the behest of Congress, accept 
responsibility for updating the law, closing loopholes, and infusing the law with the 
practical insights of experience.”148 Democracy must mean, at least, advancing 
popular will, and legislatures are too constrained to “satisfy the electorate’s demand 
for criminal law.”149 Moreover, federal prosecutors are not totally isolated from 
democratic inputs and controls: “[F]ederal prosecutors are appointed by the 
President and are accountable to the Attorney General, [and] their participation in 
constructing a system of federal common law crimes assures that its content will be 
responsive to public sensibilities.”150 
Kahan’s theory of beneficial delegation undoubtedly supports the creation of 
administrative crimes. While his observations are technically limited to the dynamics 
 
143. Id. at 481–82. 
144. Id. at 482 (“Delegated common law-making also promotes the efficient updating of the 
criminal code. As markets and technologies change, so do the forms of criminality that feed on them. 
Keeping up with the advent of new crimes would severely tax Congress’s lawmaking resources, and no 
doubt often exceed them, were Congress itself obliged to specify all operative rules of criminal law.”). 
145. Id. (“A related efficiency associated with delegated common law-making is its power to 
avoid loopholes. Criminality assumes diverse and heterogeneous forms. Enumerating all of them is 
impossible. Accordingly, were Congress obliged to enact only fully specified criminal statutes, it would 
often be possible for offenders to evade punishment by substituting unprohibited types of wrongdoing 
for closely analogous illegal ones.”). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 482 n.81. He acknowledges the controversial nature of the claim: “This is in fact a 
controversial assumption. According to one view, the chief virtue of separation of powers is that it 
prevents the federal government from being perfectly responsive to the public demand for law; the 
brake that it applies to the lawmaking process secures individual liberty.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
148. Id. at 484–85. 
149. Id. at 484; see also Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (1999). 
150. Kahan, supra note 133, at 485. He notes that this is true “at least in theory,” and he then 
goes on to discuss pathologies. Id. 
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between the DOJ, the federal judiciary, and Congress, they imply a deeper support 
for legislative delegation to executive branch entities in all similar political systems. 
The “political” constraint of consensus-generation preventing legislative outputs in 
criminal law is not unique to the U.S. Congress and applies with comparable force 
to state legislatures. 
Kahan’s claims can be contrasted with those of Rachel Barkow.151 Barkow 
argues that the functionalist pro-delegation consensus in administrative law 
(typified by Kahan’s theory) produces dangerous results when applied to criminal 
law.”152 She warns that in criminal law, the “structural and process” protections that 
constrain most administrative law do not apply.153 The Administrative Procedures 
Act (APA) does not limit prosecutorial discretion or the rulemaking of the United 
States Sentencing Commission,154 and political process checks are “not as balanced 
as they are in the regulatory sphere” because “those accused of crimes are among 
the most politically anemic groups in the legislative process.”155 The only alternative 
constraints—the individual rights provisions in the Constitution—are “poor 
safeguards against structural abuses and inequities.”156 
While the procedural protections in criminal law are weaker than in 
administrative law generally, the sanctions attached to criminal violations are 
nevertheless much higher. “The state poses no greater threat to individual liberty 
than when it proceeds in a criminal action,” Barkow writes, as criminal proceedings 
are “the means by which the state assumes the power to remove liberty and even 
life.”157 She repeatedly highlights liberty deprivation as a unique sanction and also 
mentions criminal sanctions’ condemnatory or stigmatic effects.158 Overall, the 
primary need for a closer attention to separation of powers concerns in the criminal 
context is because the “stakes are higher.”159 Weak protections against the harshest 
state action results in a paradox: “Thus, in the very area in which state power is most 
threatening—where it can lock away someone for years and impose the stigma of 
criminal punishment—institutional protections are currently at their weakest.”160 
 
151. Barkow, supra note 115. 
152. Id. at 995. 
153. Id. at 994. 
154. Id. at 995. 
155. Id. (“Criminal defendants do not coalesce into an organized group, and those individuals 
and organizations that represent their interests tend to be disorganized and weak political forces. In 
contrast, powerful interests often lobby for more punitive laws. The executive branch in particular has 
an incentive to push for tough laws to encourage plea bargaining and cooperation. The politics of crime 
definition and sentencing are therefore far more lopsided than the politics associated with the 
administrative state, where it is more common to have groups on both sides of the issue that act to 
check government abuse of power.”). 
156. Id. at 993. 
157. Id. at 995. 
158. Id. at 1054 (“There is all the more reason to use it in the criminal context, where the stakes 
are higher and the potential for abuse is so much greater.”). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 995. 
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Barkow argues that “a more strict division of powers” in criminal law is the 
appropriate response to this paradox,161 as “[t]he impediments to action provided 
by the separation of powers check state abuse and preserve the interests of 
individuals and local and political minorities.”162 Contra Kahan, efficiency of 
criminal lawmaking is thus no trump card when assessing this arrangement: “The 
inefficiency associated with the separation of powers serves a valuable function, 
and, in the context of criminal law, no other mechanism provides a substitute.”163 
Separation of powers works to achieve the constraints in criminal law that the APA 
and political process provide in normal administrative law, and therefore advances 
the underlying “liberty interests” that motivate the separation.164 
Barkow’s argument for a stricter “division” of powers in the context of 
criminal law has an obvious implication for administrative criminalization: if powers 
must be strictly divided, then legislatures must not delegate criminalization authority 
to executive branch agencies. Her observation that the Bill of Rights does little to 
prevent structural abuse applies especially to the criminalization stage of the criminal 
law process; these provisions create almost no limit on what can be criminalized 
and how the offenses must be defined, and mostly cover how crimes can be 
investigated, proven, and punished.165 Moreover, the political process checks are 
similarly weak with many administrative crimes that affect “anemic” political groups 
(the class of sex offenders in Gundy is a good example).166 However, like the Touby 
Court, Barkow may be less troubled by administrative crimes given that the APA 
and its state law analogues do apply to criminal rulemakings. 
As we have seen, critiques of administrative crimes, both judicial and 
academic, all employ a technique of observing the distinctively severe nature of 
criminal sanctions versus other types of authoritative responses to violations of legal 
 
161. Id. at 993–94 (“Although the administrative state has structural and process protections 
that can justify some flexibility in the separation of powers, those checks are absent in the criminal 
context. And in their absence, it is critically important to maintain a strict division of powers.”). Beyond 
the “functionalist” argument presented above, Barkow also discusses another reason for strict 
separation of powers in criminal law: history and constitutional text. She argues that the Framers were 
concerned with aggregation of punitive state power in a single institution, and therefore codified 
numerous criminal law protections in the Constitution itself. Id. at 994. 
162. Id. at 1031 (She expects that this will be accomplished through a mechanism along the lines 
of a “classic representation-reinforcing theory for judicial review.”). 
163. Id. (“[A]rguments for dismantling this scheme on the basis of efficiency grounds—that the 
state is hamstrung in its ability to proceed in criminal cases—disrupt the very core of why we have 
separation of powers in the first place.”). 
164. Id. at 996. 
165. See Brenner M. Fissell, Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Law, 46 HOFSTRA  
L. REV. 489 (2017) (summarizing the sparse substantive limits on criminalization that have 
constitutional status). The two most significant limits on criminalization imposed by the Bill of Rights 
are the requirement of specificity imposed by the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the limitations on 
the punishment of speech that are imposed by the First Amendment. 
166. Of course, this will not be true when the typical defendant affected by an administrative 
crime is a large corporation or wealthy executive, as is the case with many financial and  
environmental offenses. 
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duties. Unique is the sanction’s ability to deprive individuals of liberty (and very 
rarely, of life), but also unique is its condemnatory or stigmatizing effect. 
Justice Brennan spoke of “liberty and the exercise of fundamental freedoms” 
being implicated,167 while Justice Marshall wrote that the “severe impact of criminal 
laws on individual liberty” made judicial review of administrative crimes 
imperative.168 The Gundy dissenters, too, noted that in that case the “nation’s chief 
prosecutor” was empowered to “adopt new federal laws restricting liberty.”169 
Professors Abrahams and Snowden similarly noted this stigmatic effect in saying, 
“[O]nly in connection with [a criminal] proceeding will [an offender’s] status as a 
wrongdoer invoke certain attitudinal values of the community.”170 Similarly, Mark 
Alexander writes, “[t]he criminal penalty represents the ultimate governmental 
intrusion on individual freedom, together with a sense of community approbation 
not present in other government action.”171 Professor Barkow also emphasizes the 
“higher” “stakes” in criminal law, specifically in that criminal proceedings “are the 
means by which the state assumes the power to remove liberty and even life,”172 
and where “state power . . . can . . . impose the stigma of criminal punishment.”173 
Finally, AJ Kritikos claims that criminal law delegations should be more suspect 
because “life and personal liberty are at stake.”174 
For all of these critics and commentators, the uniquely harsh sanctions that 
result from criminal law violations makes delegation of criminalization a matter of 
special concern apart from the standard subjects of administrative law. This is clearly 
right. As Douglas Husak stated in another context, “[t]he criminal law is 
different . . . because it burdens interests not implicated when other modes of social 
control are employed.”175 This can be seen as the appropriate answer to the question 
posed in Touby: whether “more specific guidance is in fact required . . . in the 
criminal [delegation] context.”176 
IV. A NEW ASSESSMENT 
While the commentators above have accurately identified the immediate 
intuitive objection to treating criminal law delegations in the same way that other 
agency regulations are treated, more work must be done to theorize why this 
 
167. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 277 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring). Note that he is 
concerned with the liberty to engage in protected conduct especially. 
168. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 170 (1991) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
169. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
170. Abrahams & Snowden, supra note 122, at 9. 
171. Alexander, supra note 126, at 614. 
172. Barkow, supra note 115, at 995. 
173. Id.  
174. Kritikos, supra note 128. 
175. Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 207, 234 
(2004). See generally Nils Jareborg, Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio), 2 OHIO  
ST. J. CRIM. L. 521 (2005). 
176. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166 (1991) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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intuition is valid. We must go deeper than merely claiming that criminal law has 
“higher stakes” because it deprives people of liberty and stigmatizes them; the 
nature of these sanctions must be connected to a political theory that would provide 
a principled reason for determining what types of lawmaking institutions are 
permitted to employ these types of sanctions against violators. This is the goal of 
the next section. 
In what follows, I will first discuss the comparative peculiarity of the Supreme 
Court’s (and some state high courts’) position on administrative crimes. While a 
100-year, unbroken pedigree of validation following Grimaud makes critics of these 
offenses seem like eccentric cranks, when one looks at most Western legal systems 
(and indeed most U.S. states) it is the Supreme Court that appears to be the outlier. 
This descriptive observation of peculiarity will help to motivate what will follow: a 
normative justification of the majority position against administrative crimes. 
This justification will begin with the so-called expressive theory of punishment, 
which takes as its starting point the condemnatory dimension of state punishment. 
I will argue that expressivism implies a commitment to democratic (and not 
administrative) criminalization institutions, as administrative agencies cannot 
express condemnation on behalf of a community. Next, the liberal theory of 
punishment will be addressed. For this theory, the most significant aspect of state 
punishment is its use of physical violence or coercion though liberty deprivation 
(incarceration) or the deprivation of life (capital punishment). Because individuals 
are thought to be free and autonomous in liberal theory, this violence can only be 
justified by positing some form of consent to the criminalization system. I will argue 
that, according to liberal theory, this hypothetical consent extends only to 
criminalization by a democratic institution. 
Many may wonder why, when discussing “punishment theory,” the ubiquitous 
terms “consequentialism” and “retributivism” have not been mentioned. 
Consequentialism is the argument that punishment is justified when it has beneficial 
future effects; retributivism claims that punishment is justified when an offender 
deserves it.177 Despite the dominance of these two theories in discussions of 
punishment, I omit consideration of their effects on the validity of administrative 
 
177. This is of course an oversimplification. As Leo Zaibert observed in 2002, “The more  
or less straightforward, orthodox way of distinguishing between consequentialism and  
retributivism, according to which consequentialists justify punishment attending to its  
consequences, and retributivists justify punishment attending exclusively to desert, has now become 
obsolete, as the debate has gained in sophistication and subtlety. The specialized literature is (over-) 
crowded with sub-types of justifications of punishment: negative retributivism (desert is merely a 
necessary condition for punishment), positive retributivism (desert is a sufficient condition for 
punishment), side-constrained consequentialism (consequentialism circumscribed by desert), in 
addition to a wide variety of “mixed theories” of punishment (theories that seek to combine 
retributivism and consequentialism in multifarious ways).” Leo Zaibert, Punishment, Liberalism, and 
Communitarianism, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 673, 675 (2002) (reviewing R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, 
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001)). 
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crimes because the theories—at least as traditionally explicated178—have no 
necessary political implications. First, these theories have usually been thought of 
as moral theories, not political theories, and thus assess the concept of punishment 
in both state and non-state contexts (say, in a family). “‘Punishment theory’—with 
its tired push-me-pull-you of consequentialism and retributivism—largely has been 
an exercise in applied moral theory,” writes Markus Dubber.179 “If the state appears 
in discussions of punishment theory at all,” he concludes, “it’s often as an 
afterthought, a political epilogue to a moral treatise.”180 While certain elements of 
retributivism and consequentialism might be accommodated with or resonate with 
certain political theories, the connection is not comprehensive or necessary.181 
Retributivism and consequentialism may be implied or required by certain political 
theories, but they themselves do not substantially limit the range of acceptable 
political institutions.182 If what matters for retributivism is that blameworthy acts 
are criminalized, then it doesn’t matter who or what decides what is  
blameworthy—so long as they get it right. And if what matters for consequentialism 
is that criminalization results in the increase of social utility, then the form of the 
criminalization institution is irrelevant so long as it accurately assesses and enacts 
utility-maximizing offenses.183 
As I will argue below, this is not true of expressive theories of punishment, or 
of consent-based liberal punishment theories. These theories necessarily imply a 
certain theory of politics—namely, democracy.184 However, it is important to make 
 
178. Guyora Binder has persuasively demonstrated that the primary figures in  
intellectual history associated with these theories, Kant and Bentham, did not view them to be  
moral theories divorced from politics. See Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?, 5 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 321, 321 (2002). However, the history of these ideas has since departed from this 
political concern. Id. 
179. Markus D. Dubber, Legitimating Penal Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2597, 2597 (2007). 
180. Id. 
181. Thus, while Nicola Lacey concludes that retributivism can be “seen to proceed from” 
liberal theory, and that consequentialism “occup[ies] a secure place in the liberal tradition,” she 
nevertheless states that consequentialism “differs in material respects from that of the retributive 
theories.” NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES 
156, 159 (1988). 
182. This is compellingly demonstrated by the fact that each punishment theory has been 
employed by those holding diametrically opposing political theories. Retributivism has been argued to 
flow from Marxist theories as well as from Catholic natural law, id. at 153, while consequentialism has 
been adopted by some Rawlsian liberals, Emmanuel Melissaris, Toward a Political Theory of Criminal 
Law: A Critical Rawlsian Account, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 122, 139 (2012), but also some republicans. 
See Philip Pettit, Consequentialism and Respect for Persons, 100 ETHICS 116 (1989). 
183. Again, Binder reminds us that these denuded moral-philosophic conceptions of the 
dominant theories of punishment have strayed far from what was intended by their most famous 
proponents in intellectual history. See generally Binder, supra note 178. 
184. There are other theories of punishment that are also attuned to theories of politics, but I 
reserve discussion of these for another day. One such theory is the “republican” theory. See, e.g., JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(1990); Ekow Yankah, d, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 457 (2015) (“A republican view of criminal law brings our 
most natural intuitions back into focus by insisting that the core of criminal responsibility lies in the 
offender’s attack on the civic bonds that make living in a society as equals possible.”). 
First to Printer_Fissell (Do Not Delete) 3/17/2020  7:28 AM 
2020] WHEN AGENCIES MAKE CRIMINAL LAW 883 
clear that I do not claim that the expressive and the liberal theories must coexist 
conceptually. Indeed, many may think that such a synthesis is impossible.185 
Moreover, while I will argue that each theory implies a need for democratic 
criminalization, we will see that the two rely on different conceptions of 
democracy.186 I do not attempt to resolve this tension here, although I believe that 
it can be resolved.187 Instead, I present these two theories as, at the very least, 
independent and alternative reasons for rejecting administrative crimes. When we 
combine those who subscribe to liberal theories of punishment with those who 
subscribe to expressive theories, though, we cover a very large portion of those who 
think about state punishment. With these caveats now established, we may begin.188 
 
185. Expressive theory, as we will see, condemns offenders in the name of the community; this 
appears to require some sort of desert-based schema with which the state can determine what is worthy 
of condemnation. As Christopher Bennett argues, “[b]ecause the right to punish must, on the expressive 
theory, include the right to issue deserved condemnation, the account of state authority implied by the 
expressive theory must include some account of (epistemic) moral authority.” Christopher Bennett, 
Expressive Punishment and Political Authority, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 285, 285 (2011). This seems to 
conflict with a fundamental premise of liberalism: that political institutions will not import principles 
of decision derived from contestable visions of the meaning of human life (what Rawls called 
“comprehensive doctrines”). JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 15 (Erin Kelly 
ed., 2001) (He is thinking here, mostly, of religion). A liberal state, writes Emmanuel Melissaris, “cannot 
invoke controversial moral doctrines, which inescapably generate irresolvable disputes,” but must 
instead “be grounded in a manner that is neutral.” Melissaris, supra note 182, at 123. Expressivism’s 
claim to epistemic moral authority, it seems, is at odds with liberalism’s requirement of neutrality. 
Bennett, supra 291. (Bennett summarizes, “it is one thing to think that the state has the authority to 
protect citizens from one another; it is another to say that the state has the authority to intervene in its 
citizens lives in order to dictate to citizens about which standards they ought to find important and to 
impose condemnation on them when they disobey. The latter conception of authority might look 
overbearing, even preachy.”). 
186. The expressivist account relies on a majoritarian or self-determination conception, while 
liberal theory relies on the conception of democracy as advancing the values of liberty and equality. 
This will be discussed in more depth in what follows. 
187. Others have undertaken this task. See generally Bennett, supra note 185. 
188. A few additional, but less important, caveats should be mentioned. First, I limit my 
arguments to the punishment of natural, not corporate, persons. While a great many administrative 
crimes will punish corporations as well as individuals, see generally 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2012) (creating 
general criminal penalty for violation of regulations of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), the 
status of corporations in liberal democracy and their claim to resist state punishment is different from, 
and almost certainly inferior to, the place of natural persons—citizens who can vote and be physically 
imprisoned. For assessments of the place of corporations in the political theory of punishment, see 
recent work by W. Robert Thomas, Towards a Political Philosophy of Corporate Crime (draft on file with 
author). Thomas’s other work helps to demonstrate that general observations about punishment 
theories cannot be easily transposed onto the case of corporate defendants. See W. Robert Thomas, 
Incapacitating Criminal Corporations, 72 VAND. L. REV. 905 (2019). Moreover, it should be mentioned 
that corporations themselves fail to satisfy the demands of any minimal conception of democratic 
governance. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Markets and Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law, 74 
UMKC L. REV. 41 (2005). Second, in arguing that administrative crimes are illegitimate because they 
are not created by a democratic legislature, I am not claiming that existing legislative alternatives (such 
as the U.S. Congress) are good examples of functioning democratic institutions. To the extent that my 
argument depends on any comparison with these alternatives, with all their practical shortcomings, I 
will at least insist that they are comparatively more democratically legitimate than are agencies. For a larger 
discussion about the debate regarding the comparative “democratic” features of agencies and Congress, 
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A. Comparative Peculiarity 
When one focuses solely on U.S. Supreme Court cases, the 100-year pedigree 
of administrative crimes makes criticisms by a small number of academics and 
judges seem like the protestations of an outlier group. If one expands one’s view, 
though, it is the U.S. Supreme Court that is in relative isolation on this issue. 
Consider three observations that highlight this: the general trend away from 
common law crimes, the majority position in state constitutional law prohibiting 
criminal law delegations, and finally the prevailing view of most Western  
legal systems. 
“Common law crimes” are criminal offenses created by the judiciary, and they 
are prohibited federally as well as in most states. The Supreme Court banned this 
practice in the federal courts as early as 1812,189 and the strong trend in state law 
has been to either abolish such crimes entirely or confine them to very narrow 
subject matters. A very recent study by Carissa Hessick indicates that by 1947, 
eighteen states had abolished common law crimes expressly, and by 1976, this had 
risen to twenty-seven states.190 Today, Hessick reports that only fifteen jurisdictions 
“[expressly] recognize the common law authority of judges to convict for conduct 
that is not criminalized by statute.”191 Moreover, in this minority of common law 
crime jurisdictions, the offenses that are judicially created in general belong to the 
category of petty misdemeanors. The drafters of the Model Penal Code noted in 
their commentaries that “[t]he preservation of the common law has its largest 
practical importance in the residual area of common law misdemeanors, public 
mischief and indecency offenses.”192 Thus, while common law crimes retain some 
nominal validity in a number of states, they no longer have vitality as serious 
components of the criminal law. The trend away from common law crimes is not 
directly relevant to the question of administrative crimes, but the principle that 
motivates this trend is the same that should motive critiques of these offenses: it is 
the legislature that must create criminal offenses, not judge or executive  
branch officials.193 
 
see infra pp. 51–52. Finally, it is worth clarifying (or emphasizing) that I do not view democratic 
legitimacy as a sufficient condition for criminalization—it is merely a necessary condition. 
189. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32 (1812). 
190. Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law Crimes, 105 VA. L. REV 965, 980 (2019). 
191. Id. at 982. 
192. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.05 cmt. at 78–79 (1985); see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1(e), at 148 n.54 (3d ed. 2018) (“[See Wharton’s], where three 
categories of common law crimes are listed: (1) those which tend to provoke a public disturbance,  
(2) those involving injury to another’s property in such a way as to invite violent retaliation, (3) those 
constituting public scandal or public indecency.”) (citing 1 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 18–24 
(12th ed. 1932)); Hessick, supra note 190, at 982 (noting offenses of indecent exposure and “indecent 
handling of a dead body,” but also more serious offenses of robbery in North Carolina and 
manslaughter in Mississippi). The robbery and manslaughter examples appear to be outliers. 
193.  For a criticism of the developments in criminal law due to the trend away from common 
law crimes, see generally Hessick, supra note 190, at 971 (arguing that codification has resulted in vague 
and overly broad statutes, with crime definition delegated to prosecutors). Note, however, that Hessick 
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Next, consider the prevalent view on the nondelegation doctrine in state 
constitutional law—already discussed above. As Rossi documents, thirty-five state 
constitutions contain a “strict separation of powers clause” that not only divides 
power between branches but that also “instructs that one branch is not to exercise 
the powers of any of the others.”194 And the judges in those and other states have 
vigorously enforced this division: “Most state courts, unlike their federal 
counterparts, adhere to a strong nondelegation doctrine.”195 In the majority of 
states, administrative crimes would be unlawful as a matter of state  
constitutional law. 
Finally, when one expands one’s view beyond American law, the peculiarity of 
Grimaud and its progeny becomes even more apparent. The United States is likely 
in the minority of Western nations that permits state punishment based on 
administratively defined crimes. This is probably true because the primary 
competitor to the Anglo-American legal heritage is the “civil law” or “civilian” 
systems of Continental Europe, South America, and the Caribbean.196 In the civil 
law system, crimes usually must be specified by a legislature. One comparativist 
traces this requirement to the civilian legal principle of lex scripta: “Continental 
European legal systems interpret the lex scripta principle as requiring penalties to 
be based upon codified laws (written laws provided by the legislature).”197 George 
Fletcher concurs, writing that “it would be difficult to imagine a modern 
constitution without some recognition of the principle of legislative supremacy,”198 
and citing to German Basic Law Art. 103(2): “An act may be punished only if it was 
defined by a law as a criminal offence.”199 Fletcher also points to similar provisions 
in the Belgian and Chilean Constitutions.200 
 
does not further argue that we should turn back the clock to a common law criminal regime: “Our 
country is unlikely to return to a system of criminal common law, and this Article does not argue that 
it should. But it is important that we do not oversimplify the story about the shift from common law 
crimes to common law.” Id. 
194. Rossi, supra note 82, at 1190. 
195. Jim Rossi, Commentary, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist 
Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. [xxi] (1999). 
196. See generally LUIS E. CHIESA, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND 
COMPARATIVE MATERIALS (2014) (discussing comparative systems). 
197. Shahram Dana, Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice: A Theory on the Principle of Legality 
in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 857, 865 (2009). 
198. 1 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, 
COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 84 (2007). 
199. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 103(2) (Ger.), translation at http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.pdf [https://perma.cc/76HX-2HNU] ( last visited Dec. 28, 
2019). Note these other relevant provisions: GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 104(1) (“Liberty 
of the person may be restricted only pursuant to a formal law and only in compliance with the 
procedures prescribed therein.”); GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 74(1) (“Concurrent legislative 
power shall extend to the following matters: . . . criminal law”). 
200. See FLETCHER, supra note 198, at 84 n.48 (first citing LA CONSTITUTION art 12, cl. 2 (Belg.) 
(“No person may be prosecuted except in cases established by the law and in the form it prescribes.”); 
and then citing CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19, § 7(b) (“No one 
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This background constitutional requirement of legislative criminalization in 
the civil law world makes administrative crimes a foreign concept in many of these 
countries’ criminal laws. Consider this observation from two Spanish scholars: 
[R]egardless of the exquisitely specific way in which an administrative 
regulation may define conducts that give rise to criminal liability, the 
principle of legality requires that such specificity in the definition of 
criminal conduct stem from legislative action rather than from 
administrative regulation, for the legitimacy of criminal law flows from 
criminalization decisions that reflect the popular will of the people as 
expressed by their elected representatives.201 
Similarly, in a comparative study of nondelegation doctrine in the U.S. and in 
Germany, Uwe Kischel criticizes the Grimaud rule and contrasts it with German  
law: “Unlike Germany . . . the United States does not consider the definition of the 
primary rules of conduct, which are safeguarded by criminal sanctions, to be such a 
delicate and important matter.”202 Given all this, Luis Chiesa concludes that the 
phenomenon of administrative crimes long approved by the U.S. Supreme Court 
would “surely fail to satisfy” the requirements of civil law constitutions.203 
An example of this principle in action was the backlash by certain member 
states against administrative crimes introduced by the European Union. Consider a 
decision by the German Constitutional Court in 2016 reviewing the validity of a 
German law that criminalized the mislabeling of meat in violation of “regulation.”204 
The German ministry in charge of the food industry created regulations but did so 
merely by copying EU regulations on point.205 The court held that this violated the 
 
may be deprived of his personal freedom nor may such freedom be restricted except for the cases and 
in the manner determined by the constitution and the laws.”)). 
201. CHIESA, supra note 196, at 79. 
202. Uwe Kischel, Delegation of Legislative Power to Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of United 
States and German Law, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 213, 241 (1994). 
203. CHIESA, supra note 196, at 79. While this is Chiesa’s view, and is perhaps best exemplified 
by the Spanish position on this issue, other comparativists problematize this claim. I am indebted to 
Alessandro Corda for the following example of a somewhat compromised legality principle in a civil 
law country: In Judgement No. 168 of July 5, 1971, the Italian Constitutional Court upheld the offense 
of “Non-compliance with Orders of Authority” against a legality principle challenge. See D.L. 5 luglio 
1971, n.168, G.U. Jul. 14, 1971, n. 177 (It.), https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/1971/07/
14/071C0168/s1 (It.) [https://perma.cc/64MT-9JLX]. The offense text stated, “Whoever fails to 
observe a lawful order issued by the authorities in the interest of justice or of public safety, of public 
order or of health, shall be punished . . . .” The Court held that even though the administrative 
authorities played a role in specifying the conduct that constituted the lawful order, this did not violate 
the legality principle because the “categories” or “classes” of orders and regulations were clearly 
identified. In my view, this looks much like an American criminal contempt provision, and seems less 
like a delegation of rulemaking. 
204. BVerfG, 2 BvL 1/15, Sept. 21, 2016, http://www.bverfg.de/e/ls20160921_ 
2bvl000115.html [https://perma.cc/Z7UL-KKMG] ( last visited Dec. 28, 2019). Thanks to Antje du 
Bois-Pedain for making me aware of this general reaction to EU administrative crimes and of this case. 
205. Id. 
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legal certainty principle in German constitutional law because the punished conduct 
was not included in the formal offense.206 
The trend away from common law crimes (demonstrating an attention to the 
value of legislative criminalization), the majority position in state constitutional law, 
and the view of most civil law nations all help to highlight the peculiarity of the 
ratification of administrative crimes by the U.S. Supreme Court. While 100 years of 
unbroken jurisprudence connect Grimaud to Gundy, these decisions seem more 
isolated when viewed in contexts. 
The comparative peculiarity of administrative crimes helps to motivate a 
theoretical inquiry into their legitimacy. In what follows, I will offer normative 
justifications for the general rejection of administrative crimes, focusing on the two 
most important dimensions of criminal punishment: community condemnation and 
liberty deprivation. Each aspect of state punishment will be analyzed in terms of a 
theory of punishment that has implications for what political institutions can 
legitimately criminalize conduct. 
B. Expressive Theories of Punishment 
We begin with punishment’s condemnatory dimension, and the theory that 
understands this to be its most essential aspect: “expressivist” punishment theory. 
Most criminal lawyers are familiar with the dominant theories discussed above, but 
fewer know “expressivism” (although this theory has at times been widely held in 
academia).207 A recent formulation of the core expressivist insight is as  
follows: “punishment is permissible at least in part because it is the only, or the best, 
way for society to express condemnation of the criminal offense.”208 Expressivism 
in punishment theory originates from the legal philosopher Joel Feinberg, who  
argued that “punishment is a conventional device for the expression 
of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and 
reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in 
whose name’ the punishment is inflicted.”209 Thus, punishment possesses a 
“symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties.”210 
 
206. Id. (“[The law] merely refers to a reference point which has not been further specified by 
reference to the aforementioned European legal acts, and to a more restrictive set of behavioral 
requirements and prohibitions. Instead of determining by itself or by reference to another law, which 
behavior should be punishable by punishment, [the law] leaves it to the Federal Ministry, as far as it is 
necessary for the enforcement of the legal acts of the European Community, . . . to designate the 
offenses which are to be punished as a criminal offense . . . . Since the decree-maker therefore decides 
which conduct should be punishable, the possible cases of criminal liability can not be foreseen on the 
basis of the law, but only on the basis of [the EU] beef labeling criminal regulation. Thus, it constitutes 
an unlawful blanket [ ] authorization for the transposition of [EU Law] by a national regulation.”). 
207. Joshua Glasgow, The Expressivist Theory of Punishment Defended, 34 LAW & PHIL. 601, 
601 (2015) (“[E]xpressivist theories of punishment received largely favorable treatment in the 1980s 
and 1990s.”). 
208. Id. at 602. 
209. Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400 (1965). 
210. Id. 
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Condemnation is a mix of affective and rational disapproval, communicated 
publicly for the sake of emphasizing the values informing that disapproval, on 
behalf of an authoritative source. Feinberg’s insight was that punishment was more 
than just “hard treatment,” but also “ritualistic condemnation” with “symbolic 
conventions.”211 In other words, criminal punishment inflicts some form of 
suffering upon the offender, but it does so while conveying a certain kind of 
meaning.212 That punishment possesses this additional feature of punishment 
beyond physicality—this communication of condemnation—is the central claim of 
the expressivist theory of punishment.213 
Feinberg, the first modern expressivist, saw condemnation as serving multiple 
functions. It communicated an “authoritative disavowal” of the offender’s act, and 
“symbolic nonacquiescence” in that act.214 Thus, in condemning the offender, the 
state “go[es] on the record” as against his conduct, and therefore “the law testif[ies] 
to the recognition” that the conduct is wrongful.215 Moreover, such expressed 
condemnation “vindicate[s]” or “emphatically reaffirm[s]” the law’s efficacy, and 
absolves others suspected of wrongdoing.216 
Jeanne Hampton, one of Feinberg’s colleagues and interlocutors, added 
substantial clarifications to his theory. Hampton emphasized that the point of the 
symbolic communication of condemnation was to “reaffirm[ ]” the “moral equality” 
of the victim and offender.217 Punishment, she argued, 
 
211. Id. 
212. Consider the following explanation by Bernard Harcourt: “Suppose that someone gives 
another person a Heimlich maneuver. If the recipient is choking on her dinner, it is likely that the 
Heimlich maneuver will be interpreted as an act of good samaritanism and will be rewarded. The 
expressive dimension of that act is compassion, assistance, and support. If the recipient is a total 
stranger walking in the street, it is likely that the Heimlich maneuver will be interpreted as an assault 
and battery, a crime.” Bernard Harcourt, Joel Feinberg on Crime and Punishment: Exploring the 
Relationship Between the Moral Limits of the Criminal Law and the Expressive Function of Punishment, 5 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 160 (2001). 
213. Scholars attempting to theorize a distinction between criminal and civil wrongs have also 
highlighted this feature of criminal law. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the 
Criminal and Civil Law Models-and What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1878 (1992) 
(“Most commentators acknowledge that the following attributes tend to distinguish the criminal law 
from the civil law: . . . (5) its deliberate intent to inflict punishment in a manner that maximizes stigma 
and censure.”); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 
402–04 (1958) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it, it is 
ventured, is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its 
imposition.”); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil 
Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1809 (1992) (“In modern criminal law, the stigma of a criminal sanction has 
become a special kind of remedy because of its burdensome and sometimes destructive consequences 
for the individual.”). 
214. Feinberg, supra note 209, at 404–05. 
215. Id. at 406. 
216. Id. at 407. 
217. Heather J. Gert et al., Hampton on the Expressive Power of Punishment, 35 J. SOC. PHIL. 79, 
80 (2004); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA 
L. REV. 1659, 1686 (1992). 
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is a response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate the value of the victim 
denied by the wrongdoer’s action through the construction of an event that 
not only repudiates the action’s message of superiority over the victim but 
does so in a way that confirms them as equal by virtue of their humanity.218 
Given this goal, punishment is best performed by the state, in the name of the 
community:  
the modern state is the citizenry’s moral representative – in the face of 
pluralism and religious controversy, it is the only institutional voice of 
the community’s shared moral values . . . and thus . . . the only 
institution that can speak and act on behalf of the community against 
the diminishment offered by . . . crime.219 
Another important expressivist theorist is Antony Duff, whose central 
contribution is to emphasize punishment’s communicative aspect to the offender.220 
“Although some theorists talk of the ‘expressive’ purpose of punishment,” Duff 
notes, “we should rather talk of its communicative purpose: for communication 
involves, as expression need not, a reciprocal and rational engagement.”221 For 
Duff, then, the primary value in the expression is that it is heard by someone. 
Punishment “communicat[es] to offenders the censure that their crimes 
deserve.”222 This communication “engage[s] that person as an active participant,” 
and also “appeals to the [person’s] reason and understanding.”223 “Communication 
thus addresses the other as a rational agent,” he argues, “whereas expression need 
not.”224 The goals of the communication are “repentance, reform,  
and reconciliation.”225 
Duff goes further than saying that criminal punishment produces the above 
valuable consequences but instead argues that it is “something that a liberal state 
has a duty to do.”226 First, “the state owes it to its citizens to protect them from 
crime,” and second, “the state owes something too to its citizens as potential 
criminals.”227 “That means treating and addressing them as citizens who are bound 
by the normative demands of the community’s public values, who must thus be 
 
218. Hampton, supra note 217. 
219. HAMPTON, INTRINSIC WORTH OF PERSONS 142 (2007); see also Alon Harel, Why Only the 
State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions, 14 LEGAL THEORY 113 (2008). 
220. Duff’s seminal work is ANTONY DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND 
COMMUNITY (2001). 
221. Id. at 79. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 80. 
225. Id. at 107. On repentance: “Repentance is . . . an aim internal to censure. When we censure 
others for their wrongdoing, our intention or hope is that they will accept that censure as justified.”  
Id. On reform: “To recognize and repent the wrong I have done is also to recognize the need to avoid 
doing such wrong in the future.” Id. at 108. On reconciliation: “Reconciliation is what the repentant 
wrongdoer seeks with those she has wronged—and what they must seek with her if they are still to see 
her as a fellow citizen.” Id. Duff summarizes these as “secular penance.” Id. at 30. 
226. Id. at 112. 
227. Id. at 112–13. 
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called to account and censured for their breaches of those values,” he writes.228 
Communication of censure to offenders is an obligation of the state, but it is also 
uniquely the role of the state (and not any other institution). Punishment will 
“properly be manifested in what the state, as the legal embodiment of the political 
community, does to or about the offender.”229 
Expressivism has seen a recent resurgence in Joshua Kleinfeld’s theory of 
“reconstructivism,” which he describes as “build[ing] on the expressivist insight 
but . . . not identical to expressivism.”230 The “expressive” aspect of 
reconstructivism is described as follows: 
[P]unishment is a way of reconstructing a violated social order in the wake 
of an attack. If, for example, Person A steals Person B’s property, the 
nature of the wrong is not just the tangible harm to Person B, but also the 
message that property rights in this jurisdiction are insecure, together with 
the message that people like Person B can be abused. Punishment declares 
that the right to property still holds and re-establishes the social status of 
Person B.231 
Kleinfeld helpfully adds that the offender himself is “expressing” something 
when he violates a criminal law and that it is this that requires a response. The 
response to a “message” sent by a criminal offense is to “declare” that it was wrong 
through criminal punishment. “Condemnatory punishment with the community’s 
backing is how societies typically do and must respond if their normative orders are 
to be maintained,” Kleinfeld argues.232 This “normative order” is the “shared moral 
culture” –important not so much because it may or may not be right, but because it 
is the product of “solidarity.”233 “Social solidarity” is really just “some degree of 
pragmatic agreement, mutual intelligibility, and fellow feeling” about what conduct 
ought to be punished by the state.234 
Crucially, Kleinfeld argues that reconstructivism implies or demands 
democratic political institutions.235 “Reconstructivism as a theory of criminal justice 
and democracy as a theory of government are thus linked by what they mutually 
treasure,” Kleinfeld argues, “by the fact that both valorize a decent community’s 
ability to build a distinctive form of life infused with values that are the community’s 
own.”236 Kleinfeld’s conception of democracy is grounded in “popular sovereignty 
and self-government,” and “focus[es] on whether the views of the people who make 
 
228. Id. at 113. 
229. Id. at 114. 
230. Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129  
HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1525 (2016). 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 1490. 
233. Id. at 1492. 
234. Id. at 1493. 
235. Joshua Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1455 (2017). 
236. Id. at 1456. 
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up the political community are reflected in their law.”237 Thus, criminal law must 
reflect majoritarian popular will, and “only those acts that violate and attack the 
values on which social life is based, and can therefore truly be characterized as 
‘antisocial,’ should be legally designated crimes.”238 Criminal law should not merely 
be another “tool for social control that can be enlisted against anything we wish to 
curb,” but instead be “restrict[ed] . . . to widely recognized and highly  
culpable wrongdoing.”239 
Kleinfeld has made an important point about expressivism, and one that is 
probably implied or assumed by prior theorists: for state punishment to express the 
community’s condemnation, the determination of what conduct leads to this 
condemnation must be determined by the community. In other words, 
criminalization must be democratic. Recall Feinberg’s comment that punishment 
expresses “judgments of disapproval and reprobation” that might come from 
“either . . . the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the 
punishment is inflicted.”240 But Feinberg was speaking about punishment more 
generally and not just state punishment. In the context of state punishment (and 
not, say, in a family), one imagines he would have limited the source of the 
condemnatory judgments to the political community as represented 
democratically—the people “in whose name” the government acts. Hampton is 
more direct: the state is the “only institutional voice of the community’s shared 
moral values” and thus “the only institution that can speak and act on behalf of the 
community.”241 While she did not invoke the term itself, only a democratic 
criminalization institution can live up to this requirement.242 Similarly, Duff argues 
that criminal law’s condemnatory feature is needed to censure those who violate 
“the community’s public values,” and limits the punishing authority to the “state, as 
the legal embodiment of the political community.”243 It is hard to imagine how 
anything other than a democratic institution can approximate with legitimacy the 
values of the entire community, and codify them into criminal law. Kleinfeld’s 
linkage of expressivism and democracy thus makes explicit what was  
long presupposed. 
The insight of expressivist punishment theory is that the symbolic 
communication of condemnation must come from the community and that 
therefore the duties imposed by criminal law must be determined by a democratic 
institution. This has significant implications for the legitimacy of administrative 
 
237. Id. at 1465. 
238. Id. at 1456. He calls this the “moral culture principle of criminalization.” 
239. Id. at 1478. 
240. Feinberg, supra note 209, at 397–423. 
241. HAMPTON, supra note 219, at 142. 
242. Given that she was speaking of a “modern” state in the context of “pluralism,” she almost 
certainly meant a modern liberal democracy. Id. 
243. Duff’s seminal work is DUFF, supra note 220, at 113–14. 
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crimes. Overall, it means that because agencies cannot approximate or stand in for 
the “community,” they are illegitimate criminalization institutions. 
Agency decision-makers are not elected by a majority of the members of the 
community, and therefore cannot claim to act or speak on behalf of the political 
community or to be controlled by it. Citizens do not determine outcomes through 
voting, and therefore agencies need not criminalize conduct in a manner that is 
consistent with existing social norms. Even when their pronouncements align with 
community values, though, this is problematic due to the skewed symbolic 
significance of a condemnation that emanates from a bureaucratic (and not 
democratic) source. We will explore these observations in what follows. 
When expressivism244 claims that criminalization must be democratic, this 
means “majoritarian”—“focus[ed] on whether the views of the people who make 
up the political community are reflected in their law.”245 Majoritarianism has 
implications for administrative crimes. Agencies, both federal and state, are almost 
always (and at the federal level, always) controlled by appointees. These are people 
who have some degree of interest or expertise with regard to an agency’s regulatory 
mission, and who have political alignment (usually partisan) with an elected 
executive who serves as the appointing authority. When regulations are issued that 
carry criminal penalties, they are issued in the name of the administrative agency’s 
head—not any elected person or institution. Consider the administrative crime 
ratified by the Arizona Supreme Court that was discussed earlier relating to food 
stamp fraud: in that case the offense was defined by the Director of the Arizona 
Department of Economic Security, who is appointed by the Governor.246 The 
administrative crime in Touby—possession of a controlled substance—was defined 
by the Drug Enforcement Agency Administrator, an official appointed by the 
President.247 Those with direct control over the makeup of agency regulations are 
rarely elected (notable exceptions are many states’ attorneys general and treasurers). 
 
244. Here, I mean the variant of expressivism typified by Kleinfeld’s work discussed earlier. 
Kleinfeld, supra note 230. 
245. Of course, there are competing theories of democracy. Kleinfeld, supra note 235, at 1465 
(“[T]hose that see democracy exclusively in terms of governmental processes (e.g., voting in elections, 
representative institutions, parliamentary supremacy, checks and balances); those that see democracy in 
terms of advancing liberal values (e.g., equality, liberty, individual rights); and those that see democracy 
in terms of collective self-determination, popular sovereignty, and self-government, and therefore focus 
on whether the views of the people who make up the political community are reflected in their law (e.g., 
majoritarianism, communitarianism, certain types of republicanism).”); see also Kahan, supra note 149, at 
796–97 (1999). Kahan identifies two competing variants of democracy—one being a “pluralist 
conception [which] views government as more or less democratic depending on the extent to which 
official decisions conform to the aggregated preferences of the electorate,” and the other, “civic 
republicanism,” being concerned with “the extent that official decisions are reached through a process 
of reflective deliberation on the ‘common good.’” Id. at 796. Kahan’s “pluralist” conception seems very 
similar to Kleinfeld’s “collective self-determination” conception. 
246. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1952 (2012). 
247. Exec. Order No. 11,727, 38 Fed. Reg. 18,357 ( July 10, 1973). “There shall be at the head 
of the Administration the Administrator of Drug Enforcement, hereinafter referred to as ‘the 
First to Printer_Fissell (Do Not Delete) 3/17/2020  7:28 AM 
2020] WHEN AGENCIES MAKE CRIMINAL LAW 893 
Because elected officials do not directly control the content of administrative 
law, it is possible that administrative crimes can communicate a condemnatory 
message that is not faithful to the larger viewpoint of the community. These would 
be expressions of bureaucratic condemnation, not societal condemnation. Consider 
various cases in which societal intuitions regarding punishment seem mismatched 
with that being condemned by expert agencies. 
A Colorado administrative crime relating to alcohol control is a good example. 
Colorado’s Executive Director of the Department of Revenue has the power to 
create rules regarding the “proper regulation and control of the . . . sale of 
alcohol,”248 and violations of these rules are punishable as a “petty offense.”249 
Some of the rules created, though, seem to be quite broad. This is especially true of 
Regulation 47-900, which is called the “Conduct of Establishment” and governs the 
premises of liquor licensees’ establishments.250 In the “Basis and Purpose” section 
preceding the operative clauses, the Agency claims that “[t]he purpose of this 
regulation is to exercise proper regulation and control over the sale of alcohol 
beverages, promoting the social welfare, the health, peace and morals of the people 
of the state, and to establish uniform standards of decency, orderliness, and service 
within the industry.”251 Here an expert agency explicitly aims to promote the “peace 
and morals” of the citizenry; that this is not merely stock language becomes 
apparent when one reads the explicit rules. The Agency prohibits employees of 
alcohol establishments from wearing revealing clothing (in which genitals or breasts 
are revealed), but also prohibits patrons from engaging in certain conduct.252 One 
strikingly broad provision prohibits “[a]ny person on [a] licensed premises touching, 
caressing or fondling the breasts, buttocks, anus, or genitals of any other person.”253 
This means that two lovers consensually touching each other’s buttocks in a bar are 
committing criminal conduct. Similarly, patrons may not “[wear or use] any device 
or covering of any kind, which exposes or simulates the breasts, genitals, anus, pubic 
hair or any other portion thereof.”254 A wearable costume with the cartoon 
depiction of breasts is therefore prohibited. Is this conduct worthy of societal 
condemnation? Would such a criminal offense be able to garner a majority of votes 
in the state legislature after an open debate and public scrutiny? Here we have an 
example of moralistic criminalization via administrative agency. 
Even when an agency is expressing condemnation that is in line with general 
societal viewpoints, though, it is still a problem. In such a case, the condemnation 
issued by the agency is an accurate reflection of what the community might itself 
 
Administrator.’ The Administrator shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate . . . .” 5 U.S.C.A. app. § 5 (1973). 
248. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-3-201-02 (2019). 
249. Id. § 44-3-904. 
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condemn if it got around to doing so, but it is not an expression of that 
condemnation from the community; the two align out of coincidence or prudence on 
the part of the agency, but not out of necessity. Crucially, this different,  
non-majoritarian source deprives the condemnation of its “symbolic” significance. 
Consider the following hypothetical: in a small midwestern town, a local codes 
officer named Jim issues rules regarding trash pickup that are generally reasonable 
and supported by most of the townsfolk. When Jim issues a fine for a citizen’s 
failing to take in a trashcan before dark, does this sanction carry the same  
sting—the same meaning—as it would if the elected town council had voted and 
adopted the same rule? I think it does not. The fined citizen could legitimately say 
“Jim does not speak for all of us” and could hold his head high at local dinner parties 
without suffering the same stigma. The point is that condemnation may be rightly 
visited upon certain conduct, but it carries a different meaning when the  
decision-maker defining the conduct worthy of that condemnation does not speak 
for the community—when the decision-maker is just “Jim” or any other person 
who happens to hold a government office. 
What truly symbolic condemnation demands is a majoritarian source of the 
condemnation decision. Only a majority of the community can speak as the 
community itself, and it must be the community that communicates or expresses to 
the offender and to everyone else what conduct warrants condemnation. Of course, 
we do not have a direct democracy in which popular vote determines the content 
of the criminal law—nearly all criminal offenses are created by elected 
representatives, and not by voter initiative. But “delegation” of condemnation 
decisions to an elected representative is qualitatively different from that 
representative’s further delegation to an unelected agency head. In the case of the 
latter, and unlike the former, the citizen-voter is severed from the decisionmaker; 
the citizen-voter cannot possibly register an authoritative voice for or against an 
agency decisionmaker or an agency’s decision.255 
If one accepts the above claim as a normative matter, this renders much of the 
debate about the nondelegation doctrine less relevant in the context of criminal law. 
First, consider what many have called the central issue with respect to 
nondelegation: whether agencies are sufficiently “accountable” to the people.256 
 
255. This is disputed by Posner and Vermeule, who write, “[b]eneath their masks, the critics of 
delegation are direct democrats, and they should aim their arguments at representative democracy, not 
at delegation, which is but a small part of it.” Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1754 (2002) (“In their preoccupation with delegation 
among all the other devices used to make policy, the critics of delegation treat the nondelegation 
doctrine as a fetish that would ward off all the evils of representative democracy.”). This critique seems 
a bit overblown—at least if one is an expressivist. The expressivist, I think, would find that a qualitative 
shift occurs when a citizen’s voice—his or her expression of condemnation—does not have authority 
to weigh in and be counted with respect to the decisionmaker or the decision. 
256. Thomas Merrill calls this “[t]he most prominent argument advanced by the proponents of 
strict nondelegation,” which he describes as “the desirability of having public policy made by actors 
who are accountable to the people.” Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From 
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2141 (2004). Cass Sunstein describes 
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Critics of administrative delegations such as JH Ely emphasize the lack of electoral 
control of administrators: “[t]he point is not that such ‘faceless bureaucrats’ 
necessarily do a bad job as our effective legislators. It is rather that they are neither 
elected nor reelected, and are controlled only spasmodically by officials who are.”257 
Defenders of delegation respond to this not by denying the desirability of 
accountability but instead by emphasizing the potential for even greater 
accountability through agency rulemaking. As Gerry Mashaw argues, “the flexibility 
that is currently built into the processes of administrative governance by relatively 
broad delegations of statutory authority permits a more appropriate degree of 
administrative . . . responsiveness to the voter’s will than would a strict 
nondelegation doctrine.”258 
“Accountability,” though, seems outside of the concerns of the expressivist 
punishment theory we have presented. What matters is not that condemnation be 
communicated by an “accountable” official or institution, but that it be 
communicated by the majority of the community itself, and through a majoritarian 
decision-making process. It must be the emanation of the majority of the 
community, and it is therefore problematic even when citizen preferences and 
administrative punishment align harmoniously. Thus, Mashaw and Schuck’s (and 
Kahan’s) promise of a more accessible and responsive administrative state will not 
assuage the concerns of the expressivist. The same can be said to those who see 
presidential or gubernatorial control, or congressional oversight, as solving the 
accountability problem.259 These are post-hoc review mechanisms that need not be 
 
the accountability argument as “the most important” functionalist claim of nondelegation proponents. 
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 319 (2000). 
257. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131 (1980); see also DAVID SCHOENBROD, 
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY 14 (1993) (“We can refuse to reelect legislators who make laws we 
dislike. Delegation shortcircuits this democratic option by allowing our elected lawmakers to hide 
behind unelected agency officials.”); Merrill, supra note 256 (“Congress, it is argued, is the most 
democratically accountable political institution; hence, if we want policy made by actors accountable to 
the people, we should require that policy (at least ‘important’ policy) be made by Congress rather than 
by unelected administrators.”). 
258. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 153 (1997). Similarly, Peter 
Schuck concludes that, “[t]oday, the administrative agency is often the site where public participation 
in lawmaking is most accessible, most meaningful, and most effective.” Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and 
Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781–82 (1999). Accessible 
because “the costs of participating in the rulemaking and more informal agency processes, where many 
of the most important policy choices are in fact made, are likely to be lower than the costs of lobbying 
or otherwise seeking to influence Congress.” Meaningful because “the policy stakes for individuals and 
interest groups are most immediate, transparent, and well-defined at the agency level.” Effective 
because “the agency is where the public can best educate the government about the true nature of the 
problem that Congress has tried to address” and because “the details of the regulatory impacts are 
hammered out there.” 
259. As Jerry Mashaw writes, “[a]ll we need do is not forget there are also presidential elections 
and that, as the Supreme Court reminds us in Chevron, presidents are heads of administrations.” 
MASHAW, supra note 258, at 152. Thus, for Mashaw, vague delegations to agencies are “a device for 
facilitating responsiveness to voter preferences expressed in presidential elections.” Sunstein, supra note 
256, at 323 (“Agencies are themselves democratically accountable via the President, and any delegation 
must itself be an exercise of lawmaking authority, operating pursuant to the constitutional requirements 
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undertaken as a matter of course; majoritarian control, as I have explained it, must 
be present at the initial stage of criminalization. For the expressive dimension of 
criminal law, “accountability” is not enough—it is not just that problematic outlier 
offenses must be redressable, but that every offense must originate from a 
majoritarian wellspring. 
Beyond accountability, consider a second major debate regarding 
nondelegation: the value of agency deliberative process. This debate can be situated 
within the “civic republicanism” tradition, which is concerned with “the extent that 
official decisions are reached through a process of reflective deliberation on the 
‘common good.’”260 Almost everyone agrees that reasoned deliberation is a good 
thing, and therefore critics and defenders of agency delegation have each sought to 
assess whether agencies do this more effectively than a legislature. An elaborate 
presentation of this argument has been undertaken by Mark Seidenfeld, who notes 
that unlike Congress,  
[a]dministrators at least operate within a set of legal rules 
(administrative law) that keep them within their jurisdiction, require 
them to operate with a modicum of explanation and participation of 
the affected interests, police them for consistency, and protect them 
from the importuning of congressmen . . . who would like to carry 
logrolling into the administrative process.261  
All this is probably true: when comparing the legislative process with the 
administrative process, the latter seems far more rational and deliberative. 
Again, though, this is all beside the point—stellar deliberative processes 
 
for the making of federal law. Congress may face electoral pressure merely by virtue of delegating broad 
authority to the executive; this is a perfectly legitimate issue to raise in an election, and ‘passing the 
buck’ to bureaucrats is unlikely, in most circumstances, to be the most popular electoral strategy. If 
Congress has delegated such authority, perhaps that is what voters want.”). With respect to Congress, 
Peter Schuck lists the following as its “numerous formal and informal controls over agency  
discretion”: “statutory controls; legislative history; oversight; the appropriations process; statutory 
review of agency rules; and confirmation of key personnel.” Schuck, supra note 258, at 784. Posner and 
Vermeule also remind us that Congress can be chastised by the people for its use of delegation. Posner 
& Vermeule, supra note 255, at 1748–49 (“The problem with this argument is that Congress is 
accountable when it delegates power—it is accountable for its decision to delegate power to the agency. 
If the agency performs its function poorly, citizens will hold Congress responsible for the poor design 
of the agency, or for giving it too much power or not enough, or for giving it too much money or not 
enough, or for confirming bad appointments, or for creating the agency in the first place. And, as noted 
above, Congress is accountable not only in this derivative sense. Congress retains the power to interfere 
when agencies make bad decisions; indeed, it does frequently . . . . Accountability is not lost through 
delegation, then; it is transformed.”). 
260. Id. at 797. 
261. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105  
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515, 1542 (1992). Thomas Merrill also notes that “[a]dministrative  
rulemaking . . . is subject to a much more unyielding set of procedural requirements [than legislation], 
including advance notice to the public, disclosure of studies and data on which the agency relies, 
extensive opportunity for public comment, and a requirement that agencies respond to and explain 
their disagreement with material comments submitted from any quarter.” Merrill, supra note 256,  
at 2155. 
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cannot save administrative crimes from the expressivist critique advanced above. 
This critique cares primarily about “who” decides to criminalize and is unconcerned 
with “how” except insofar as the process is directly related to the need for a 
legitimate source of the criminalization decision. Thus, a process requirement of 
majoritarian voting is necessary, but there is no requirement that very good debates 
take place before the vote is taken. Tellingly, civic republican proponents of 
delegation are candid in their disavowal of majoritarianism. “[T]he theory,” 
Seidenfeld admits, “does not equate the public good that legitimates government 
action with majority rule.”262 
C. Liberal Theories of Punishment 
Having completed a discussion of the condemnatory dimension of criminal 
sanctions, and its relevance for administrative crimes, we turn to the aspect of state 
punishment that involves liberty-deprivation. This aspect implicates a different 
theory of punishment that is concerned with the legitimacy of state coercion 
deployed against autonomous individuals. This is the “liberal” theory of 
punishment, which might also be described as a “consent-based” theory. Roughly, 
the liberal theory of punishment posits that the violent coercion inherent in criminal 
sanctions is only legitimate if it can somehow be thought of as consented to. We 
shall explore this somewhat counterintuitive proposition in what follows and will 
see that it has significant implications for the legitimacy of administrative crimes. 
It is said, rightfully, that the United States aspires to be a “liberal” state—not 
in the sense of left-wing social and economic policy, but in the sense that it takes a 
respect for individuals’ freedom and equality as its foundational political principle. 
As Sharon Dolovich writes, a liberal state “elevates individual liberty in its many 
forms to the highest political value . . . and measures the legitimacy of political 
systems by the degree to which they accord sovereignty to the people,” and in the 
United States, “political life . . . is routinely punctuated with the rhetorical 
invocation of these very values.”263 Thus, the self-conception and indeed aspiration 
of this country is to adhere to the principles of liberalism. But this is no passing fad, 
nor is the United States alone in this regard. Noting that liberalism has achieved an 
“ideological victory,” intellectual historian Duncan Bell concludes that “[m]ost 
inhabitants of the West are now conscripts of liberalism: the scope of the tradition 
has expanded to encompass the vast majority of political positions regarded as 
legitimate.”264 
 
262. Id. at 1528. 
263. Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 
312 n.11 (2004). 
264. Duncan Bell, What Is Liberalism?, 42 POL. THEORY 682, 689 (2014); see also Raymond 
Geuss, Liberalism and Its Discontents, 30 POL. THEORY 320, 320 (2002) (“[W]e know of no other 
approach to human society that is at the same time as theoretically rich and comprehensive as liberalism 
and also even as remotely acceptable to wide sections of the population in Western societies . . . .”). 
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Given the central importance of liberalism in American politics and western 
political thought, it is worth identifying the element of liberalism most relevant for 
criminal law265: the concept of individual autonomy or freedom.266 Liberalism takes 
this as its starting point, and structures political institutions around this  
bedrock value.267 
Given the centrality of the value of individual autonomy, liberalism tests the 
legitimacy of political institutions and how they act against this value.268 As Lacey 
writes, a feature of liberalism “closely related to the value attached to autonomy” is 
that liberalism “generates a relatively stringent conception of the limits of state 
action.”269 Governmental restrictions on liberty are “subject to a heavy burden of 
justification” in a liberal state,270 and restrictions that fail to meet this burden, then, 
are said to be “illegitimate.”271 
What can serve as a justification for the restriction on autonomy, though, and 
when can such a justification meet the “burden” of legitimacy? This question 
becomes most critical when assessing the institution of state punishment. State 
punishment is a species of coercion, and is thus among the most intrusive forms of 
state action; even more significantly, though, this coercion takes the form of 
violence. Punishment thus presents a problem for a liberal theorist—autonomy 
must be respected, but punishment severely curtails it.272 This, at least, is 
 
265. For a discussion of a more complete range of the features of liberalism, see LACEY, supra 
note 181, at 143–68. For history of the idea, see generally Bell, supra note 264. 
266. LACEY, supra note 181, at 93 (“Closely related to the liberal vision of rational persons is 
the notion of humans as free and responsible agents, capable of understanding and controlling their 
own actions . . . . Both rationality and the capacity for responsible action are thus for liberalism at once 
factual features of human nature and sources of normative limits on the ways in which human beings 
may be treated, particularly by political and other public institutions.”). 
267. Thus, Dolovich labels “individual liberty” a “baseline” “liberal democratic value” while 
Emmanuel Melissaris notes that respect for personal freedom is a “fundamental liberal assumption.” 
Dolovich, supra note 263, at 313–14; Melissaris, supra note 182, at 123. 
268. Markus Dubber calls autonomy the “fundamental touchstone of legitimacy” in “modern 
democratic societies.” “Legitimacy discourse in the United States since the Revolution has revolved 
around autonomy; its recurrent theme is the call for more thorough application of the ideal, not for its 
replacement with another guiding principle.” Dubber, supra note 179, at 2603. 
269. LACEY, supra note 181, at 97–98. 
270. Id. 
271. Indeed, some theorists claim that all political authority is illegitimate. See William  
A. Edmundson, State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 215 (2004) (discussing 
philosophical anarchist position). 
272. “[Liberal] theorists were inclined to view punishment (a certain kind of coercion by the 
state) as not merely a causal contributor to pain and suffering, but rather as presenting at least a prima 
facie challenge to the values of autonomy and personal dignity and self-realization-the very values 
which, in their view, the state existed to nurture. The problem as they saw it, therefore, was that of 
reconciling punishment as state coercion with the value of individual autonomy.” Jeffrie G. Murphy, 
Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217, 223 (1973); see also Dolovich, supra note 263, at 310 
(“Any theory of state punishment in a liberal democracy must grapple with the problem of political 
legitimacy. The punishment of criminal offenders can involve the infliction of extended deprivations 
of liberty, ongoing hardship and humiliation, and even death. Ordinarily, such treatment would be 
judged morally wrong and roundly condemned, yet in the name of criminal justice, it is routinely 
imposed on members of society by state officials whose authority to act in these ways toward sentenced 
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uncontroversial: for a liberal state, punishment poses a major legitimacy problem.273 
For such a fundamental problem, though, punishment theorists have made 
surprisingly few attempts to address it. Instead, punishment has largely been 
examined as an issue in moral philosophy.274 
This has begun to change; liberal philosophers of punishment and liberal 
theorists of criminal law have increasingly sought to reconcile their political theories 
with the phenomenon of state punishment.275 As Alice Ristroph argues, if “there is 
some relationship between the legitimacy of punishment and more general political 
legitimacy,” then “theorists of state punishment should engage” with the latter.276 
Theorists who have heeded this call generally attempt the reconciliation by positing 
that consent of the citizen bound by criminal law can solve punishment’s legitimacy 
 
offenders is generally taken for granted.”); Dubber, supra note 179 (“[A]s the most severe form of state 
coercion, punishment poses the most serious challenge to the legitimacy of the state. If punishment can 
be justified, so can other, lesser, forms of coercive state action. If it cannot, what is the point of 
legitimizing, say, taxation (with or without representation)? . . . . [O]ne way of framing the question of 
legitimacy might be this: how can a state that derives its legitimacy from protecting its constituents’ 
rights violate the very rights it exists to protect?”). 
273. Claire Finkelstein, Punishment As Contract, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L 319, 324 (2011) (“My 
point of departure will be an assumption that has become standard in the punishment theory literature. 
Because it involves the deprivation of personal liberty and the infliction of physical hardship, 
punishment is presumptively impermissible. The practice of punishment therefore stands in need of 
justification if the background moral objections to it are to be overridden.”). 
274. “Although normative inquiry into justifications of punishment has been extensive, it has 
largely been pursued from the perspective of moral philosophy.” Corey Brettschneider, The Rights of 
the Guilty: Punishment and Political Legitimacy, 35 POL. THEORY 175, 175 (2007); see also Binder, supra 
note 178. One potential explanation for this is that many of these philosophers believe that state 
punishment cannot be legitimized; this is the position of the so-called “philosophical anarchists” who 
deny the legitimacy of political and legal authority altogether (including, of course, criminal law) and 
also of modern radical and critical legal theorists. See Edmundson, supra note 271, at 219. Others who 
are neither philosophical anarchists nor critics may come to the same conclusion from an observation 
of punishment practices in the real world. “In fact, an open-minded inquiry into the principles and 
norms (never mind the actual operation) of American penal law must be prepared to conclude that the 
difficulties of legitimating the state violation of the autonomy of its constituents through the threat and 
eventual infliction of punitive pain (as opposed to some other, less intrusive, means) are 
insurmountable.” Dubber, supra note 179, at 2612. “It also generally follows that punishment, as we 
currently know and understand it, may not be an appropriate measure at all and should never be 
employed.” Melissaris, supra note 182, at 142–43. However, I suspect that the lack of attention paid to 
the political legitimacy of punishment has a more mundane explanation—it is because the topic of 
punishment first became debated vigorously in the philosophy departments of universities, and not in 
politics or law departments. See generally Michael Davis, Punishment Theory’s Golden Half Century: A 
Survey of Developments from (About) 1957 to 2007, 13 J. ETHICS 73 (2009). 
275. “In recent years, the counterintuitive claim that criminals consent to their own punishment 
has been revived by philosophers who attempt to ground the justification of punishment in some 
version of the social contract.” Richard Dagger, Social Contracts, Fair Play, and the Justification of 
Punishment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341, 341 (2011); see also VINCENT CHIAO, CRIMINAL LAW IN THE 
AGE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, at vii (2018) (“The criminal law is a public institution that has 
a profound impact on people’s lives. It therefore seems appropriate to see how it stacks up under 
familiar principles of political justification . . . .”). 
276. Alice Ristroph, Conditions of Legitimate Punishment, in THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 79, 83 (Zachary Hoskins & Chad Flanders eds., Rowman & Littlefield 2015). 
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deficit.277 This is not the consent of the individual criminal to be incarcerated, but 
instead the constructive consent of a rational or reasonable hypothetical citizen 
setting up a political institution. As Jeffrie Murphy argues, 
What is needed, in order to reconcile my undesired suffering of 
punishment at the hands of the state with my autonomy (and thus with the 
state’s right to punish me), is a political theory which makes the state’s 
decision to punish me in some sense my own decision. If I have willed my 
own punishment (consented to it, agreed to it) then— even if at the time I 
happen not to desire it—it can be said that my autonomy and dignity 
remain intact.278 
As we will see, sophisticated attempts to legitimize state punishment in a liberal 
state appear to presuppose that a democratic legislature is the institution that is 
determining what conduct is to be criminalized. Consent-based theories of state 
punishment, then, should be viewed as precluding a regime of administrative crimes. 
Liberal theories of punishment have deep historical roots.279 The famous 
social contract theorist Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote, “[I]t is in order not to be the 
victim of a murderer that a person consents to die if he becomes one.”280 Influenced 
by Rousseau,281 Italian criminal law theorist Cesare Beccaria similarly argued that 
“[i]t was thus necessity that compelled men to give up part of their personal liberty 
[to the state] . . . [and] [t]he aggregate of these smallest possible portions constitutes 
the right to punish.”282 Immanuel Kant—the thinker so influential in the retributive 
punishment theory that flourished in philosophy departments—also presents a 
political, contractarian theory. As Guyora Binder summarizes, for Kant “the tension 
between law and the moral autonomy of those subject to it frames the problem of 
justice, or legitimate coercion,” and “Kant’s solution to this paradox is a social 
 
277. Per Ristroph, “Some form of consent [is] widely viewed as the “gold standard” for political 
legitimacy, [and] is posited as a necessary condition for political legitimacy.” Id. 
278. Murphy, supra note 272, at 224; see also Dubber, supra note 179, at 2598 (“One answer to 
this question-and at any rate the one I am interested in exploring here proceeds from the claim that the 
fundamental principle of legitimacy in the modem state is autonomy, or self-government. So, quite 
simply, punishment is legitimate if and only if it is consistent with the principle of autonomy. Put 
another way, punishment is legitimate if and only if it is self-punishment.”); Finkelstein, supra note 273 
(“The high justificatory hurdle for our practices of punishment provides a reason to return to the 
forgotten contractarian approach to punishment: If it is easier to justify the enforcement of voluntary 
arrangements than involuntary ones, a theory of punishment that convincingly predicates a consensual 
foundation for the institution should depict the institution as easier to justify than other types  
of theories.”). 
279. Finkelstein, a “modern” contract theorist, makes the following historical  
observation: “First, there is a robust contractarian tradition that emerged in seventeenth century 
political philosophy, first with the writings of Thomas Hobbes, later in the Enlightenment version of 
this same tradition in the writings of Locke and Rousseau, and finally in a Kantian version of the 
tradition, as developed by John Rawls.” Finkelstein, supra note 273, at 322. 
280. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 64 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith 
R. Masters trans., St. Martin’s Press 1978) (1762) (Richard Dagger unearthed this intriguing line). 
281. Binder, supra note 178, at 334–35 (linking Rousseau and Beccaria). 
282. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 12 (Aaron Thomas ed., Aaron 
Thomas & Jeremy Parzen, trans., Univ. of Toronto Press 2008) (1764). 
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contract, modeled on Rousseau’s, in which society’s members freely subject 
themselves to law.”283 
Modern consent-based theories add sophistication to older “social contract” 
thought experiments. Most important are the theories that build on the work of 
liberal philosopher John Rawls,284 applying his framework to the issue of state 
punishment. Rawls’s solution to the legitimacy problem noted above was to posit a 
“counterfactual” pre-political agreement of free individuals to submit themselves to 
political society and the coercion of law.285 This was famously called the “original 
position,” in which people were behind a “veil of ignorance” about what type of life 
they would be born into; Rawls argued that reasonable people would all agree on 
certain principles of justice that would in turn be implemented into law.286 The 
original position solves the legitimacy dilemma in the same way that the historical 
theories of social contract solved it—by hypothesizing a pre-political consent to 
political institutions. The coercion of contemporary law is theoretically consented 
to by the reasonable citizen in the original position, even if you do not consent to 
this or that specific law.287 
 
283. Binder, supra note 178, at 352–53. 
284. I say “build on” because Rawls’s seminal works did not present a fully fleshed out theory 
of punishment. See Chad Flanders, Criminals Behind the Veil: Political Philosophy and Punishment, 31 
BYU J. PUB. L. 83 (2016) (describing difficulties in reconciling Rawls’s statements about punishment 
with his statements about distributive justice). Rawls did weigh in on the debates taking place in the 
1950s regarding retributivism and deterrence, and he advocated for a rule-utilitarianism. John Rawls, 
Two Concepts of Rules, 44 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955). 
285. Melissaris, supra note 182, at 125. 
286. Dagger, supra note 275, at 344. The world “reasonable” is significant here. There is a debate 
amongst consent-based punishment theorists as to whether the people reasoning before they agree to 
the social contract are merely “rational agents” concerned with self-interest (“contractarians”) or are 
“reasonable citizens” who are concerned about other people and “committed to fair cooperation.”  
Id. at 344–57. In this section I consciously adopt the latter conception of the liberal individual, as it is 
not clear to me that rational agents would necessarily demand democratic institutions. Tellingly, Dagger 
traces the rational-agent liberals back to Hobbes, the famous theorist of centralized power, and the 
reasonable-citizen liberals back to Rousseau—a famous democrat. Id. at 345. For a sophisticated 
presentation of the rational-agent theory not presented here, see Finkelstein, supra note 273, at 314–31. 
I must also bracket off a third variant of contractarian thought—“fair play” accounts. Zachary Hoskins, 
Fair Play, Political Obligation, and Punishment, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 53 (2011) (describing “the fair play 
view, according to which punishment’s permissibility derives from reciprocal obligations shared by 
members of a political community, understood as a mutually beneficial, cooperative venture. Most fair 
play views portray punishment as an appropriate means of removing the unfair advantage an offender 
gains relative to law-abiding members of the community.”). Like the rational-agent theories above, a 
fair play account of liberal punishment does not clearly imply a demand for a democratic legislature to 
determine what conduct is criminal. It is conceivable that conduct creating an “unfair advantage” is 
conduct that can be determined by some sort of agency or bureau. For a very recent variant of a “fair 
play” theory that suggests this, see generally CHIAO, supra note 275. Chiao’s theory imposes a 
requirement of “equal opportunity for influence” in the content of the criminal law but notes that this 
principle “could be consistent with both popular and bureaucratic models of oversight over criminal 
justice.” Id. at 78–79. Chiao’s monograph was published during the editing process of this Article, and 
therefore I must leave it to later work to respond in full to his important new insights. 
287. Importantly, most theorists do not view state punishment as legitimate because the 
offender has somehow forfeited his rights to be free from coercion due to the commission of his 
offense—thus putting himself outside of the protections of society. This argument was perhaps most 
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Theorists have applied this reasoning to argue that state punishment retains 
its legitimacy, or can at least be tested for legitimacy, by how well it lives up to or 
fails to live up to Rawlsian principles.288 Corey Brettschneider cites to Rawls’s 
“liberal principle of legitimacy,” that “exercise of political power is fully proper only 
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all 
citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of the 
principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”289 This principle 
of reasonable endorsement by free and equal citizens is, according to 
Brettschneider, the same principle that can “justify[ ] political coercion to those who 
are guilty of crimes” and that indeed this justification of criminal punishment is 
“central” to the legitimacy principle.290 For Brettschneider, Rawlsian theory 
provides a litmus test for the legitimacy of various punishment practices by  
the state: 
Crucial here is the question of whether a particular criminal sanction 
respects each individual’s status as a free and equal citizen . . . . At the same 
time, however, a legitimate polity will employ legal constraints in the form 
of criminal law to curb destructive or antisocial behavior, so that some 
citizens do not violate others’ basic interests, such as security.291 
Criminal punishment, through Rawlsian theory, then, is the modern 
explanation for Rousseau’s cryptic remark about the murderer consenting to his 
 
famously advanced by John Locke in his Second Treatise: “[A] criminal . . . hath, by the unjust violence 
and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be 
destroyed as a lion or a tiger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor 
security.” JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8 (Prentice Hall Inc. 1997) (1690); 
Christopher W. Morris, Punishment and Loss of Moral Standing, 21 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 53, 53–54 (1991) 
(advancing similar argument). This “forfeiture” account is rightly rejected by most, as it cannot explain 
why even clearly guilty offenders—say, those who confess and provide video proof, and then ask for 
punishment—nevertheless deserve the procedural protections normally accorded to defendants. See 
Dagger, supra note 275, at 349 (discussing objections to forfeiture account); Finkelstein, supra note 273, 
at 218 (same). 
288. Rawls’s theory is avowedly an “ideal theory” in which “[e]veryone is presumed to act justly 
and to do his part in upholding just institutions.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 8 (Harvard 
Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999). This would preclude the need for criminal sanctions, as all would obey legal 
obligations (he called this “strict compliance”). Rawls did not necessarily view his theory as being 
applicable to a society where people routinely disobey legal duties—this was what he called a society of 
“partial compliance,” and in such a society it was not enough to consider the requirements of justice, but 
also to consider “the principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice.” Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
For a comprehensive discussion of how Rawlsian theory is nevertheless relevant to the question of state 
punishment, see generally Dolovich, supra note 263, at 307. See also Melissaris, supra note 182, at 131 
(“As Rawls admits, a theory of justice must be adjustable to nonideal conditions of partial compliance. 
This is not to say that state punishment is rendered morally or otherwise necessary or a priori. The fact, 
however, that it is a practice so central in modern states and that it is a prima facie way of dealing with 
partial compliance means that it must be tackled and put in the right perspective. And this must be 
done coherently in a way that does not undermine the foundations of the whole edifice.”). 
289. Brettschneider, supra note 274 (“I draw in particular on Rawls’s ‘liberal principle  
of legitimacy.’”). 
290. Id. 
291. Id. at 177. 
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own execution. “If those who have committed crimes were to think of themselves 
as citizens who accept others’ status as free and equal and were motivated to reach 
universal agreement,” Brettschneider asks, “which punishments could they or could 
they not reasonably accept?”292 
Sharon Dolovich similarly rests her argument on the Rawlsian framework. “If 
the exercise of state power in a liberal democracy is to be legitimate,” she writes “it 
must be justifiable in terms that all members of society subject to that power would 
accept as just and fair,” and “[t]his imperative is particularly acute in the context of 
criminal punishment.”293 The traditional problem for consent-based theories of 
punishment is that it seems fanciful that any criminal would willingly submit to hard 
treatment, but Rawls’s Veil of Ignorance allows for a theory of such consent by 
“abstracting consideration of the particular details of . . . individual lives.”294 
Legitimate state punishment is that which is “exercised on the basis of a collective 
agreement” that “we would all accept as just and fair if we were to find ourselves 
behind a veil of ignorance.”295 
Crucial for the issue of administrative crimes is that mainstream liberal theory 
presupposes that those in the Original Position would agree that a democratically 
elected legislature is a requirement of the liberal principle of legitimacy. While the 
connection between liberalism and democracy is a complicated one, most liberal 
theorists today analyze the concepts in tandem.296 As Rawls argued in Political 
Liberalism, “citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in 
a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one 
another fair terms of cooperation according to what they consider the most 
reasonable conception of political justice.”297 This mutual recognition of freedom 
and equality—this reciprocity—leads to requirements for institutional structure. 
Reasonable citizens considering the reciprocal status of their co-citizens in a 
cooperative system would not prevent their co-citizens from having political power. 
“[E]qual political liberty” writes Amy Gutman, “entails the right of adult members 
of a society to share as free and equal individuals in making mutually binding 
decisions about their collective life.”298 
This is made more explicit when Rawls discusses his “four-stage sequence” 
for determining the principles of justice and applying them in an actual society: (1) 
 
292. Id. at 186. 
293. Dolovich, supra note 263, at 314. 
294. Id. 
295. Id. at 315. 
296. See Amy Gutmann, Rawls on the Relationship Between Liberalism and Democracy, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS (Samuel Freeman ed., 2006); John Rawls, The Idea of Public 
Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 769–70 (1997) (“The idea of public reason arises from a 
conception of democratic citizenship in a constitutional democracy . . . . [I]t is a relation of free and 
equal citizens who exercise ultimate political power as a collective body.”). See also John Skorupski, 
Rawls, Liberalism, and Democracy, 128 ETHICS 173 (2017) (comparing “new” mainstream liberal 
democratic theory with “old” liberalism not inherently tethered to democracy). 
297. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 446. 
298. Gutmann, supra note 296, at 173; see also Rawls, supra note 296, at 769–71. 
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the Original Position (discussed earlier), which is in turn implemented in terms of 
fundamental political-institutional arrangement during the (2) “constitutional 
convention,”299 after which comes (3) the legislative stage where, as Dolovich puts it, 
citizens “identify and enact into law the policies that best realize the principles 
previously selected.”300 Legislation is similar to the Original Position in that state 
coercion is not directly assigned to individuals, but is instead abstracted (although 
much less so). “At this stage, although the parties continue to deliberate behind the 
veil, it is now thinner,” Dolovich argues, “allowing in the information about the 
particulars of their own society necessary if the parties are to make informed 
judgments, while at the same time still screening out the parties’ knowledge of their 
attributes and personal particulars.”301 That the “parties” merely continue the prior 
stages’ “deliberation” at the legislative stage implies that this legislature must be 
democratic—it must allow for the inputs of all the free and equal citizens who took 
part in the deliberation of the Original Position and the Constitutional Convention. 
And it is here “at the legislative phase,” Dolovich concludes, “when the principles 
of punishment are translated into actual policies.”302 What she almost certainly 
means by “policies” here are rules of conduct and the punishments meted out for 
their disobedience—criminal laws and sentencing laws. 
That the legislative stage must be democratic is almost like stating a circular 
proposition, and indeed some Rawlsian theorists appear to take for granted that 
liberal punishment will also be democratic punishment. Brettschneider, for 
example, does not appear to demand democratic institutions because of the 
contractualist account of legitimacy; instead, the contractualist account of legitimacy 
flows from a prior requirement of democracy.303 Emmanuel Melissaris makes this 
point more directly, stating that while the paradox of state punishment of free 
individuals disappears in the liberal Rawlsian solution, this requires that after the 
agreement to the general scheme at the prior stages, “inclusive democratic political 
institutions and decision-making procedures must be in place.”304 
 
299. RAWLS, supra note 288, at 195–200. 
300. Dolovich, supra note 263, at 423. 
301. Id. “[This is what] Rawls terms [the] ‘the legislative stage,’ at which policy deliberations 
take place behind what we can think of as a ‘modified veil.’” Id. at 421. 
302. Id. at 402. 
303. Brettschneider, supra note 274, at 179 (“Such an account of justification is inclusive in its 
respect for all citizens’ status as free and equal and avoids the aristocratic or sectarian problems that 
would arise from basing justification on one particular theory of general moral truth. In this sense, I 
have argued elsewhere that contractualist justification is a democratic account of legitimacy.”) (citing 
COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS: THE SUBSTANCE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT (2007)). 
304. Melissaris, supra note 182, at 142. It is worth noting that the conception of democracy 
underlying these liberal theories of punishment is one that is different from the conception utilized in 
the prior section discussing the expressive dimension of punishment. While the expressive theory 
outlined above adopts a “majoritarian” or “popular sovereignty” conception of  
democracy—demanding that “the views of the people who make up the political community are 
reflected in their law,” Kleinfeld, supra note 235, at 1465—the theories discussed here are premised on 
a conception of democracy that is defined by how well political institutions “advance[e] liberal values 
(e.g., equality, liberty, individual rights).” Id. Given that these are “liberal” theories of punishment, this 
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The implication for the status of administrative crimes becomes immediately 
apparent under this framework: the offenses result in state punishment that has not 
been consented to via a democratic criminalization institution, and they are 
therefore illegitimate. The Liberal Principle of Legitimacy demands that legal 
coercion only be employed on terms agreed to by reasonable citizens recognizing 
each other as “free and equal in a system of social cooperation,”305 which implies, 
as Gutman puts it, “equal political liberty” in a democratic political institution.306 
This authority that flows from the reciprocal consent to political obligation ends 
with the democratic institution; government agencies and bureaus not structured on 
the premises of democratic decision making procedures cannot share in it. Free and 
equal individuals would not, in the Original Position and the Constitutional 
Convention, agree to punishment that is promulgated by administrative agencies on 
the basis of their technical expertise. They would instead agree to criminalization at 
the Legislative Stage. But one need not only look at the characteristics of the 
Legislative Stage to know that administrative agencies have no role in it. The role of 
agencies is made clearer by Rawls’s placement of “administrators” in the “fourth 
stage” alongside judges.307 Agencies, like judges, apply the rules created at the 
legislative stage to “particular cases.”308 Rule-application does not require the same 
 
is unsurprising. Liberalism, not majoritarianism, is the central constellation of values to be advanced. 
Thus, Dolovich rejects that “the legitimacy of [criminal] policies may simply be found in the political 
process itself, and in particular in the status of legislators who wrote the laws as duly elected democratic 
representatives.” Dolovich, supra note 263, at 312–13. Legitimacy cannot be equated with “democratic 
majoritarianism,” she argues, because “there is nothing inherent in the majoritarian standard to ensure 
that legislators even fairly consider the interests of all citizens subject to the laws they pass.” Id. A 
majority might run roughshod over an unpopular minority, and the logic of majority voting does 
nothing to prevent it. This is insufficient for a liberal theory, as the liberal principle of legitimacy 
requires that political power be “exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all 
citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse . . . .” Brettschneider, supra note 274. 
A free and equal citizen would not endorse the unreasonable legislative oppression of his or her group 
merely because a competing group managed to win fifty-one percent of the seats in the legislature. The 
liberal conception of democracy requires that “all norms are to be determined through democratic 
deliberation and decision-making and in light of public reason,” and therefore “all [must] be given the 
opportunity to participate in political decision-making.” Melissaris, supra note 182, at 148. This is in 
contrast to a “mere formalist majoritarianism.” Id. 
305. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 446. 
306. Gutmann, supra note 296, at 173. 
307. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 199. 
308. Id. Agency rulemaking (even noncriminal) may therefore be illegitimate altogether under 
the Rawlsian framework. But see Dolovich, supra note 263, at 423 (“It is Rawls’s position that no limits 
on self-knowledge are necessary at the final, adjudicative stage at which the policies and laws enacted 
by the legislature are to be applied. Yet any broad policies derived from the principles will necessarily 
remain at some level of abstraction, and will continue to require judgments and assessments of the 
available evidence if decisions are to be reached. Thus here too, it seems to me, decision makers will 
continue to be susceptible to the corrupting effects of the knowledge of their personal particulars that 
Rawls is so concerned to purge from the deliberations at prior stages. For this reason, I expect that 
some modified veil of ignorance, at least for the decision maker, would also be required at the last stage, 
in order to ensure that the policies chosen at the third stage remain as true in their implementation as 
the process of deriving the principles on which they were based.”). 
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degree of democratic input over decision-making as does application which—at 
least in determinate cases—involves no need for value judgments. 
CONCLUSION 
The application of the nondelegation doctrine to criminal law is effectively a 
test of the extent to which criminal law’s “legality principle” has purchase in current 
law. While the Supreme Court and many state high courts have carved out a place 
for non-legislative criminalization when that criminalization is delegated to 
administrative agencies, this consensus should be questioned. Criminal law 
expresses the condemnation of the community and therefore must originate from 
the community. Similarly, criminal punishment coerces through liberty deprivation 
and therefore must be legitimized through citizen consent. Both expressivist and 
liberal theories of punishment, then, demand that criminalization be democratic. 
While the claim of this Article is that administrative crimes suffer from a legitimacy 
deficit as a matter of political theory, this is potentially relevant to constitutional law 
if in a future case the nature of the delegated power is taken into consideration. This 
argument, if accepted, would not lead to the death of the administrative state—it 
would merely confine agencies to the use of civil sanctions. 
 
